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companies, who in turn strengthened security measures on consumer
smartphones to reduce unauthorized government access. Apple, in
particular, designated itself as the company that prioritizes user security
and privacy above all, and now boasts some of the strongest encryption
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which desires probative evidence from encrypted smartphones and entities
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the critically acclaimed television sitcom, Parks and
Recreation, one of the main characters, Ron Swanson, protects his
privacy with a zealous vigor and repudiates the local government’s
attempts to gather information about his life.1 Throughout the
show, Swanson takes exaggerated efforts to prevent his coworkers
from learning anything about him beyond his name, leading to
comical interactions with other characters who hold differing
opinions on the amount of personal information they are willing
to reveal to the world. His battle for his right to privacy falters,
however, when a new technology company in town collects and
uses the data without any authorization from the user. Though
this company is entirely fictional, Swanson’s concerns about the
unauthorized collection and misuse of his personal information
reflect concerns of real individuals. He worries that the collected
data might fall into the wrong hands, and for him, the wrong
hands often belong to nonsensical bureaucrats.
Parks and Recreation’s arc picks up on a trope popularized by
George Orwell’s 1984,2 which depicts a world where technological
1. See Adrienne Tyler, Parks & Recreation: How Old Ron Swanson Is at The Beginning
& End, SCREENRANT (Aug. 1, 2020), https://screenrant.com/parks-recreation-ronswanson-nick-offerman-age-old/ [https://perma.cc/JXS6-SDDJ]; see also Jason
Diamond, Masculinity in the Age of Ron Swanson: The Legacy of Parks and Recreation’s Most
Iconic Character, VULTURE (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.vulture.com/2015/02/parks-andrecreation-ron-swanson-masculinity.html [https://perma.cc/YTY2-2PNP].
2. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (alternatively published as Nineteen Eighty-Four).
See, e.g., Ian Crouch, So Are We Living in 1984?, NEW YORKER MAG. (June 11, 2013),
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advances resulted in increased government surveillance and
pervasive violations of privacy rights. Nearly thirty years later than
Orwell’s timeline, in 2013, Edward Snowden exposed the global
surveillance state.3 His disclosures revealed the extent to which
the US government had surveilled its citizens, as well as the
activities of other governments in collecting data on both their
citizens and persons in other countries.4 The US government
deemed this level of surveillance necessary and found that
pending threats from foreign actors outweighed the risks to civil
liberties.5
One of the most shocking revelations was that these
governments manipulated existing technology created by
prominent companies to gather the information.6 For companies
like Apple, the Snowden disclosures posed a serious problem.7 To
the outside world, technology companies appeared to be eagerly
complying with government data-collection programs, and
smartphones (like the iPhone), which were intended to help
individuals connect, were instead being used as surveillance tools

https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/so-are-we-living-in-1984
[https://perma.cc/299D-RJC8]. The novel injected phrases such as “Big Brother is
watching you” into popular culture. For an example of its influence on the American
judiciary, see Judge Reinhart’s dissent in United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th
Cir. 2004). Judge Reinhardt illustrates the concerns of a police state and underlines the
importance of adapting the law to today’s technology. Id.
3. See Rachel Taylor, Intelligence-Sharing Agreements & International Data Protection:
Avoiding A Global Surveillance State, 17 WASH U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 731, 731 (2018).
4. See Mark Mazetti & Michael Schmidt, Ex-C.I.A. Worker Says He Disclosed U.S.
TIMES,
June
10,
2013,
at
A1,
Surveillance,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leakedsurveillance-data.html?searchResultPosition=7
[https://perma.cc/9DRT-Y7CM];
Snowden Revelations, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelations
[https://perma.cc/ZV3D-F7LW] (last visited May 31, 2020) (indicating that, for
example, the National Security Agency has worked with Australia, Germany, and the
United Kingdom).
5. See TIMOTHY H. EDGAR, BEYOND SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, MASS SURVEILLANCE, AND
THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM THE NSA 17 (The Brookings Inst., 2017).
6. Snowden Revelations, supra note 4.
7. See Kristen Jacobsen, Game of Phones, Data Isn’t Coming: Modern Mobile Operating
System Encryption and its Chilling Effect on Law Enforcement, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 566, 589
(2017) (“Numerous technology companies, including Apple and Google, redesigned
their products to include encryption in direct response to Edward Snowden’s infamous
disclosure regarding the US government’s mass surveillance.”).
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by the government.8 Subsequent scandals highlighted the abuse
of data by malevolent actors when technology companies failed
to vigilantly restrict data access.9 In response to negative public
reactions, Apple and other technology companies doubled their
commitment to privacy and security by embracing stronger
encryption on their products.10 While the average iPhone user
may have been thrilled by the idea that the government could not
get into her smartphone so easily,11 law enforcement officials in
varying jurisdictions are now frustrated by the fact that encryption
impedes their efforts to solve crimes.12
Referred to by some as the “Encryption Debate” and by
others as the “Going Dark” problem,13 this conflict between law
8. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple’s Evolution into a Privacy Liner, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24,
2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/apples-evolution-into-a-privacy-hard-liner1456277659 [https://perma.cc/42L7-7Z8J].
9. See Matthew Rosenberg & Gabriel Dance, Affected Users Say Facebook Betrayed Them,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2018, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/us/facebookusers-data-harvested-cambridge-analytica.html [https://perma.cc/E4YF-N75X]. See also
Emily Stewart, Mark Zuckerberg said Facebook “made mistakes” on the Cambridge Analytica
scandal.
He’s
not
apologizing,
VOX
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/3/21/17148852/mark-zuckerberg-facebookcambridge-analytica-breach. A related issue is the misuse of data by the technology
companies themselves, but that issue will not be discussed as it is beyond the scope of the
arguments posited here.
10. See Wakabayashi, supra note 8. See also Scott J. Shackelford et al., iGovernance:
The Future of Multi-Stakeholder Internet Governance in the Wake of the Apple Encryption Saga,
42 N.C. INT’L L. 883, 924 (2017) (“[T]he U.S. government does not seem to fully
comprehend how the rules of the game for companies like Apple, Google, Microsoft,
and Facebook were changed by those disclosures. In fact, Apple’s strong commitment to
encryption was likely informed by those revelations.”); David Sanger & Brian Chen,
Signaling Post-Snowden Era, New iPhone Locks Out NSA, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014, at A1,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphone-locks-out-the-nsasignaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/BYH8-6WNW].
11. But see Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 172
(2018) (“Despite all the publicity around security-enhancing technologies, we don’t
know whether consumers actually care about them – that is, whether they buy the new
iPhone because it has end-to-end encryption rather than because it has a bigger
screen.”).
12. See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, MOVING THE
ENCRYPTION POLICY CONVERSATION FORWARD, 3 (2019) [hereinafter CARNEGIE].
13. See Maj. Gen. Charles, J. Dunlap, Jr., Essay, Social Justice and Silicon Valley: A
Perspective on the Apple-FBI Case and the “Going Dark” Debate, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1685, 1688
(2017); CARNEGIE, supra note 12; WASH. POST EDITORIAL BD., Opinion, Putting the digital
keys to unlock data out of reach of authorities, WASH. POST (July 18, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/putting-the-digital-keys-to-unlock-data-outof-reach-of-authorities/2015/07/18/d6aa7970-2beb-11e5-a25042bd812efc09_story.html [https://perma.cc/V5XH-M3GE].
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enforcement and technology companies is currently playing out
throughout the world and at the federal, state, and local levels in
the United States.14 In many ways, striking the right balance in
providing information to law enforcement while protecting
security and privacy interests is an engineering problem, not a
legal one.15 Yet, the “technological arms race”16 between
governments and companies propelled to the front of the debate
two significant legal questions on resolving this tension: first,
whether the government can compel technology companies like
Apple to code backdoors17 into their smartphones to provide
“extraordinary access” to data, and second, whether the use of
alternative methods by the government implicates existing
privacy rights.
This Note explores and analyzes these questions with a focus
on the US approach to extraction of data from encrypted
smartphones. This discussion proceeds in five Parts. Part II
provides the factual background for the debate: a primer on
encryption, interests of law enforcement, and the two
technological methods at issue in the debate. Part III explores the
current international legal landscape with a focus on the
countries that are most vocal in the Encryption Debate: the
United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, and China. Part IV
discusses US laws and cases on the debate, analyzes the two issues
posed above, and provides important considerations and
implications for resolving the debate in the United States. Part V
argues that the United States should not compel technology
companies to provide extraordinary access to smartphones by
modifying the encryption code, and should instead utilize other
means of procuring data that does not threaten existing security
and privacy rights. Part VI concludes by reiterating that lawful
hacking is the appropriate solution for the Encryption Debate
14. See infra Part III.
15. See Steven Levy, Cracking the Crypto War, WIRED MAG. (May 25, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/crypto-war-clear-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/FM9KN49K]; Steven Bellovin et al., Analysis of the CLEAR Protocol per the National Academies’
Framework, 3 DEP’T COMPUT. SCI. COLUM. U. 18, 2 (May 10, 2018) (critiquing one
proposed engineering option).
16. CYRUS VANCE JR., REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
ON: SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY 30 (Nov. 2016) [hereinafter VANCE
2016].
17. See infra Section II.C.
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and that the United States’ ultimate choice will have a global
impact.
II. THE FACTS ABOUT ENCRYPTION
The term “encryption” evokes images of computer hackers
racing against the clock to crack the code and help the suave hero
save the world.18 In reality, encryption refers to a method of data
protection wherein said data is scrambled, making it inaccessible
to anyone without the “decryption key.”19 The value of encryption
depends on the end user, the type of data that needs to be
protected, and the complications that may arise when the
accessibility of that data becomes strictly limited to specific users.
To understand the role of encryption in the debate, this Part
provides the factual background giving rise to the tension.
Section II.A discusses the ideological underpinnings of
encryption and data protection, details on how encryption works,
and how Apple20 uses encryption in its devices. Section II.B
18. For a real-life example of hackers saving the day, consider the hacktivist group,
Anonymous. The group espoused libertarian views, sometimes extreme and divisive, but
often efforts focused on uncovering and revealing the conduct of malevolent actors. Dale
(Aug.
11,
2020),
Beran,
The
Return
of
Anonymous,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/08/hacker-group-anonymousreturns/615058/ [https://perma.cc/6HLJ-XQLQ]. Its founder, Aubrey Cottle, has set
his sights on dispelling falsehoods spread by QAnon—a group whose supporters have
notably manipulated and warped public discourse to the point that the FBI considers it
a domestic terror threat. See Shawn Langlois, Founder of hacker group Anonymous reveals his
(Nov.
2,
2020),
ultimate
‘end-game’,
MARKETWATCH
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/founder-of-hacker-group-anonymous-reveals-hisultimate-endgame-11604336926 [https://perma.cc/DDF9-749A]; A.J. Vicens & Ali
Breland, QAnon is Supposed to Be All About Protecting Kids. Its Primary Enabler Appears to
Have Hosted Child Porn Domains, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/10/jim-watkins-child-pornographydomains/ [https://perma.cc/TB9U-P2Q4]; Kevin Roose, What is QAnon, the Viral ProTIMES
(Jan.
17,
2021),
Trump
Conspiracy
Theory?,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-qanon.html
[https://perma.cc/F9H3TTBN].
19. See Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 1, 9 (2008)
[hereinafter Ohm, Good Enough]; see also Whitson Gordon, The One Thing that Protects a
Laptop After It’s Been Stolen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2018, at B6,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/smarter-living/how-to-encrypt-your-computersdata.html [https://perma.cc/B6TB-KD54].
20. The analysis in the Note applies to all technology companies, but will use Apple
as example given its prevalence in the industry. Apple boasts has the strongest encryption
software on the consumer market. See Matt Burgess, Apple’s privacy strength is also one of its
greatest weaknesses, WIRED MAG. (May 21, 2020), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/apple-
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discusses the legitimate interests of law enforcement in
preventing and resolving crimes and how encryption serves as a
barrier to those interests. Section II.C presents and explains two
technological mechanisms used by law enforcement as
workarounds to encrypted smartphones, and will lay the
foundation for the discussion and analysis of its legal implications
in later Parts.
A. Encryption: Ideologies, Description, and its Use in the iPhone
1. The Value of Encryption
The desire to protect personal data—and the corollary need
to build the infrastructure that controls information flows—
seems intuitive,21 or at least reasonable in an age when technology
companies are constantly challenged on their duties to their
users.22 Encryption, a form of data protection, is primarily used in
two ways: privacy and cybersecurity. Though the terms privacy and
cybersecurity are often used interchangeably, issues of data
privacy are different from those of cybersecurity.23 Data
protection and data privacy refers to ensuring the privacy of
personal information through laws regulating the collection, use,
and control of personal data,24 whereas cybersecurity is narrower
and refers specifically to the infrastructure built to secure data,
personal or non-personal.25 Both have the goal of securing data,

security-privacy-competitive-advantage
[https://perma.cc/SS5X-L26W].
Other
prominent technology companies, including Google and Huawai, also offer encryption
on their devices. See Eric Manpearl, The International Front of the Going Dark Debate, 22 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 158, 162 (2019); Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 575.
21. See generally Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
22. Shira Ovide, Congress Agrees: Big Tech is Broken, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/technology/congress-big-tech.html
[https://perma.cc/JX9Q-CB9T]; 4 Key Takeaways from Washington’s Big Tech Hearing on
‘Monopoly Power’, NPR (July 30, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/30/896952403/4key-takeaways-from-washingtons-big-tech-hearing-on-monopoly-power
[https://perma.cc/Z67X-DNM4].
23. See William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MIN. L. REV. 1135, 1141
(2019).
24. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 10, at 7-8; McGeveran, supra note 23, at 1141.
25. See McGeveran, supra note 23, at 1141.
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and encryption serves as one of several methods to prevent the
unauthorized collection of data.26
Some entities value encryption because it is a form of
cybersecurity.27 Banks, businesses, and pharmaceutical
companies are illustrative of some entities that have an interest in
protecting their trade secrets and proprietary information from
hackers and other bad actors.28 At a more granular level,
encryption ensures that the everyday computer user may enter
credit card information at the payment page of, for example, a
hotel website, without the concern that the information is being
stolen or misappropriated.29 Data breaches at large companies,
including Target and Equifax, resulted in the release of
information such as social security numbers, mailing addresses,
and other confidential records.30 Even the US federal
government is susceptible to cyberattacks: in 2015, the Office of
Personnel Management suffered a data breach that resulted in
the data of over 4.2 million employees being stolen.31 As
demonstrated by these examples, encryption matters in ensuring
that such confidential information is kept secure and private by
the entities entrusted to hold it.32 Moreover, encryption is a
necessary step in preventing sensitive and confidential
information from getting into the hands of malicious actors and
hackers.33

26. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 9-10.
27. See John Mylan Traylor, Note, Shedding Light on the “Going Dark Problem” and the
Encryption Debate, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 489, 491-92 (2016).
28. See Erick S. Lee & Adam R. Pearlman, National Security, Narcissism, Voyeurism,
and Kyllo: How Intelligence Programs and Social Norms are Affecting the Fourth Amendment, 2
TEX. A&M L. REV. 719, 763 (2015).
29. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 257
(3rd Cir. 2015) (finding that a hotel chain’s failure to secure consumer credit card
information had monetary implications for consumers and credit card companies).
30. Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach Settlement,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/targetsecurity-breach-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/VG9A-86UW]; Equifax Data Breach
Settlement,
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/refunds/equifax-data-breach-settlement [https://perma.cc/R97E-AGYA]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
31. Cybersecurity Resource Center: Cybersecurity Incidents, OFF. PERS. MGMT.,
https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/
[https://perma.cc/V6E8-RXF4] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
32. See Lee & Pearlman, supra note 28, at 758.
33. See Traylor, supra note 27, at 493.
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Others use encryption because they value their privacy and
are interested in controlling the distribution of information
about themselves.34 Facebook users, for example, were furious
when they found out their personal information was released to
a third-party, who then exploited that information by tailoring
deceptive advertisements and false news articles to ultimately
influence their votes in the 2016 US presidential elections.35 To
some, privacy allows an individual to explore her capacity for selfdetermination, autonomy, and worth.36 It creates a sphere where
a person can engage in the process of identifying conceptions of
herself or define her intimate relationships to others.37 Here,
encryption is a tool that provides a person the security she desires
in controlling who has access to information about herself.
Last, some value encryption as a form of protection from
government surveillance and state control of personal data.38 As
the entity with a monopoly on legitimate violence, the
government can exact punishment or sanctions that other actors
cannot.39 Encryption, thus, is necessary to secure protection from
government abuses. Privacy scholars argue that individuals are
free to generate ideas when the government is not involved given
that government oversight may instead lead to a chilling effect on
speech, free expression, or other limitations on civil rights.40
Where some see the oversight as necessary to incentivize good
behavior and to hold individuals or entities accountable for their
actions,41 others advance the notion that democracy is more
34. Julia Carrie Wong & Matthew Cantor, How to speak Silicon Valley: 53 essential techbro terms explained, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/jun/26/how-to-speak-silicon-valley-decoding-tech-bros-from-microdosingto-privacy [https://perma.cc/7ABP-3BXZ] (“privacy (n) – Archaic. The concept of
maintaining control over one’s personal information.”).
35. See CARNEGIE, supra note 12.
36. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 21.
37. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating that the US
Constitution creates zones, or penumbras, of privacy).
38. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 121; Olivia Gonzalez, Cracks in the Armor: Legal
Approaches to Encryption, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2019).
39. André Munro, State Monopoly on Violence, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-monopoly-on-violence (last visited Jan. 24,
2021).
40. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 22; Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 4
(“unburdened by the chilling effect of surveillance”).
41. Tom Huddleston Jr., Bill Gates: ‘Government needs to get involved’ to regulate big tech
companies, CNBC (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/17/bill-gates-
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effective when citizens are free to make decisions without
government oversight.42 In this regard, privacy from government
intrusion is necessary for dissidents or freedom fighters who seek
to reform civil society without the fear of repercussions from their
respective governments.43 In less contentious settings, many,
including industry leaders in Silicon Valley, view encryption as
necessary to balance against surveillance technology used by law
enforcement and restore the playing field to pre-digital-age
levels.44 Encryption returns to some the option to control how
their personal information is used as technological advances
threaten the surrender of that control.45
2. Defining Encryption
Encryption is a catch-all term used to refer to a method of
data protection wherein said data is scrambled, making it
inaccessible to anyone without a “decryption key” (the code that
would unlock the encryption).46 Unlike typical password
protection, encryption is coded in such a way that it is
theoretically impossible for the average user to break the
encryption without a decryption key. 47 Thus, encryption offers a
reasonable amount of confidentiality to its users. However, it is
important to distinguish the different types of encryption and

government-needs-to-regulate-big-tech-companies.html
[https://perma.cc/NQQ576VU].
42. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 62.
43. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 20; Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 119.
44. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 119; THERESA M. PAYTON & THEODORE
CLAYPOOLE, PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 237 (Rowman & Littlefield publ. 2014).
45. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 177 (“Only a few companies . . . are willing to
say what many engineers feel: government surveillance has become excessive, and the
playing field needs to be rebalanced in the direction of user privacy.”).
46. As Section II.B discusses, decryption is not an impossible feat—rather, it is about
the resources and capabilities available to decrypt the device. For example, a major
project at the NSA is to circumvent encryption measures. See Nicole Perlroth et al., N.S.A.
Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, at A1,
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html
[https://perma.cc/R56Z-KSR7]; see also Bruce Schneier, NSA surveillance: A guide to
staying
secure,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
6,
2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-securesurveillance [https://perma.cc/QVT2-CPKE].
47. See Ohm, Good Enough, supra note 19, at 9. The terms “encryption” and
“encrypted” are used interchangeably in the Encryption Debate.
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how each type is applied to tangible products and intangible
services.
The two main types of encryption are “end-to-end
encryption” (or “double encryption”) and “device encryption”
(or “full-disk encryption”).48 End-to-end encryption refers to data
that can only be decrypted by the original sender and the
intended recipient.49 End-to-end encryption is applied to protect
“data-in-motion,”50 or data that is being shared with others,
including text messages and emails. Many communication
services, like WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, use end-to-end
encryption to ensure that the only people who can access
communications are the sender(s) and recipient(s).51 Device
encryption, on the other hand, refers to a type of encryption
where the decryption key exists only on the locked device.52
Device encryption protects “data-at-rest,” which is data that is not
being shared with others in the way that data-in-motion is.53
Device encryption can be used to encrypt external hard drives
and other devices.54 This Note focuses on the latter type of
encryption and will explain in later sections why in some contexts
data derived from an encrypted smartphone is different from
data derived from encrypted communications on that
smartphone.
3. Apple and its Use of Encryption
Apple is a technology company with global operations
founded in the United States and whose devices are available in
several major international markets.55 Its products and services
dominate a significant share in the markets of each jurisdiction

48. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 574.
49. See Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, The International Encryption Debate:
Privacy Versus Big Brother, 261 N.Y. L.J. (June 12, 2019).
50. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 160; Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 135.
51. See Andy Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What is End-to-End Encryption?, WIRED MAG.
(Nov.
25,
2014),
https://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-end-to-endencryption/ [https://perma.cc/FD3Z-8574].
52. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 160.
53. See Anello & Albert, supra note 49.
54. Id.
55. Apple,
Inc.,
CNN,
https://money.cnn.com/quote/profile/profile.html?symb=AAPL
[https://perma.cc/3RD4-UNAG] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
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discussed in this Note.56 Apple produces hardware (e.g.
computers and smartphones) and software (e.g. operating
systems for its devices and associated applications).57 Its global
popularity is in part due to its simple aesthetic and clean design.58
Recently, the company refocused its brand by prioritizing user
privacy, distinguishing it from other technology companies which
used consumer data in their business models.59 In the postSnowden environment, Apple distinguished itself from
companies like Google and Facebook, which rely on collecting
and selling user data.60 When Apple introduced default
encryption in 2014 for its iPhones by way of iOS 8, it made a
credible guarantee, backed by an algorithm, that it could not
access its users’ data, signifying its commitment to user privacy.61
In addition to making encryption the default option on its
devices, the company issued a public statement outlining its
hardline stance on protecting the information of its consumers,62
reaffirming that commitment with each new update of its
56. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 160.
57. See CNN, Apple, Inc., supra note 55.
58. See Walter Isaacson, How Steve Jobs’ Love of Simplicity Fueled a Design Revolution,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/howsteve-jobs-love-of-simplicity-fueled-a-design-revolution-23868877/
[https://perma.cc/3RD4-UNAG]. The company founder, Steve Jobs, focused on
creating a product free of the confusion and complexity commonly associated with
emerging technologies. Id.
59. See Wakabayashi, supra note 8 (“In the iPhone’s early days, Mr. Jobs told
employees that the company, in effect, had a handshake agreement with customers: In
exchange for buying the device, Apple would mess with their lives as little as possible,
one former employee said. Generally speaking, this person said, that meant staying away
from users’ data and respecting their privacy.”).
60. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 116. By fall of 2020, Apple continued to
distinguish itself from its industry competitors. Its newest smartphone operating system
allows iPhone users to opt-in to companies tracking and collecting usage data across
apps. See User Privacy and Data Use, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/app-store/userprivacy-and-data-use/ [https://perma.cc/HN8C-BHZV] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); Jack
Nicas & Mike Isaac, Facebook and Apple Trade Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/technology/facebook-takes-the-gloves-off-infeud-with-apple.html [https://perma.cc/25WG-SQV5].
61. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 138.
62. See
Tim
Cook,
A
Message
to
Our
Customers,
APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/customer-letter [https://perma.cc/DF4D-3JGQ] (last visited
Jan. 24, 2021); see also Romain Dillet, Apple’s Tim Cook on iPhone unlocking case,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 21, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/21/apples-tim-cookon-iphone-unlocking-case-we-will-not-shrink-from-this-responsibility/
[https://perma.cc/J9ER-Y49G] (“We have a responsibility to protect your data and your
privacy. We will not shrink from this responsibility.”).
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operating system.63 More, its smartphones have been at the center
of prominent litigation in the United States.64 Thus, this Note will
use Apple’s technology as the example moving forward.
Apple, as both a hardware manufacturer and software
developer, uses both types of encryption for its smartphones. It
uses a form of end-to-end encryption for its iMessage and
FaceTime applications, both of which facilitate communication.65
In addition, Apple uses device encryption to lock the entire
operating system on an iPhone when not in use.66 As an added
safety measure, numerous failed password attempts reset the
phone to factory settings,67 which prevents entities from using
brute-force methods to gain access to the data on the phone.68
The company has explained that the nature of the encryption
precludes it from retaining decryption keys for both forms of
encryption.69 Simply put, if decryption keys were physical items,
Apple would not have a copy it could provide to law enforcement
or any other entity who requests one.
Despite their supposed resistance to law enforcement
requests,70 Apple and other technology companies follow all laws
of their respective jurisdictions and have issued guidance on how

63. iOS
14
is
Available
Today,
APPLE
(Sept.
16,
2020),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/09/ios-14-is-available-today/
[https://perma.cc/C5J3-XLR6] (“More Transparency and Control with Expanded
Privacy Features”).
64. See infra Part IV.
65. See
Privacy,
APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/privacy/features/
[https://perma.cc/84XP-MKZE] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
66. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 574.
67. See Shackelford, supra note 10, at 894.
68. Orin Kerr, Preliminary thoughts on the Apple iPhone order in the San Bernardino case,
Opinion, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/02/18/preliminary-thoughts-on-the-apple-iphone-order-in-thesan-bernardino-case-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/3QBG-DK8K] (“I think it’s probably
more accurate to say that this particular model phone, the iPhone 5C, has a built-in
security weakness—depending on how you define the term, a kind of backdoor—already.
The government’s order would require Apple to exploit the potential backdoor in
Apple’s design. Importantly, though, Apple redesigned its phones after the iPhone 5C to
close this potential backdoor but see update below). Later phones, starting with the
iPhone 5S, have apparently eliminated this potential way in. As a result, the specifics of
the order in the San Bernardino case probably only involve certain older iPhones.”).
69. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 1. For iPhone users who forget their passwords,
the only solution an entire reset of the device and a complete loss of their data. Id.
70. See infra Part IV.
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to request information.71 Notably, Apple cannot extract data from
passcode locked iOS devices because it “does not possess the
encryption key.”72 Thus, Apple can and does make an effort to
comply with law enforcement requests and is only limited by the
very algorithms that fulfill its promises of privacy to consumers.
B. The Legitimate Interests of Law Enforcement
For law enforcement, the data and content on encrypted
smartphones offer significant evidentiary value.73 As one legal
scholar frames it, “[t]his mass of data tells rich stories about our
lives—what we do and where, when, and with whom we do it.
Hence, it’s a treasure trove for surveillance officials.”74 The data
that can be recovered from encrypted smartphones can provide
inculpatory evidence for past crimes or help prevent future
ones.75 Targeted criminal activity ranges between terrorist acts,

71. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/NC78-JRCF] [hereinafter
Cook Letter]. On its website, Apple provides guidance for law enforcement both in the
United States and in outside jurisdictions. For the United States, Apple “will only provide
content in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause.” Legal
Process Guidelines: Government & Law Enforcement within the United States, APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZRK3-FNUS] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Apple US
Guidelines]. For jurisdictions outside the United States, Apple states that for it “to
disclose customer information in response to a request from law enforcement, it is
necessary for the requesting officer to indicate the legal basis which authorises the
collection of evidential information in the form of personal data by a law enforcement
agency from a Data Controller such as Apple.” Legal Process Guidelines: Government & Law
Enforcement outside the United States, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/lawenforcement-guidelines-outside-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7RK-BZW6] (last visited
Jan. 24, 2021) [hereinafter Apple Int’l Guidelines]. In any request, Apple can readily
provide information on device registration, customer service records, iTunes
information, retail and online store transactions, gift cards, iCloud data and content, and
“Find My iPhone” data. See Apple US Guidelines, supra note 71; Apple Int’l Guidelines,
supra note 71.
72. See Apple US Guidelines, supra note 71, at 11; Apple Int’l Guidelines, supra note
71, at 11; see also Caren Morrison, Private Actors, Corporate Data, and National Security: What
Assistance Do Tech Companies Owe Law Enforcement, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J, 407, 410
(2017).
73. See CARNEGIE, supra note 12, at 11.
74. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 114.
75. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 577-78; see Eric Manpearl, Preventing “Going Dark”:
A Sober Analysis and Reasonable Solution to Preserve Security in the Encryption Debate, 28 U.
FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 74 (2017) [hereinafter Manpearl II].
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crimes in local areas, and the sexual exploitation of children.76
Often, a significant amount of information can only be found on
the physical smartphone (as opposed to the data being
transmitted elsewhere) either because of the way the smartphone
software processes the code or because the user opts in to the
smartphone’s protective measures, preventing the data from
being accessed remotely.77 Encryption, thus, serves as a barrier to
these law enforcement interests because encryption code
prevents law enforcement from accessing underlying data that
may be necessary for the prevention, detection, and solution of
crimes.78 This Section will elaborate on some of these government
interests and the way encryption has frustrated law enforcement
efforts.
1. National Security
The September 11 terrorist attacks saw a marked shift in US
government surveillance tactics starting with 2001’s Patriot Act
which conveyed increased surveillance powers to US law
enforcement in its counterterrorism efforts.79 Timothy Edgar,
who helped build some of the surveillance programs used by the
US’s National Security Agency (“NSA”) that were later revealed
by Snowden in 2013, argues that technology-enhanced
surveillance tactics have been necessary in neutralizing terrorists
and other intelligence targets.80 The data that can be recovered
from encrypted smartphones belonging to suspected terrorists
can be necessary, according to top US officials, in preventing
76. MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, REPORT ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION
PUBLIC
SAFETY
i
(2015),
https://www.manhattanda.org/wpcontent/themes/dany/files/11.18.15%20Report%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryptio
n%20and%20Public%20Safety.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U5ZG-RNNN]
[hereinafter
Vance 2015].
77. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 577-78.
78. See PAYTON & CLAYPOOLE, supra note 44, at 207; Manpearl II, supra note 75 at
66; Morrison, supra note 72, at 409.
79. See Lee & Pearlman, supra note 28, at 769. The specific provision of the 2001
Patriot Act was later declared unlawful by a US court but Congress quickly followed with
a replacement. See TIMOTHY H. EDGAR, BEYOND SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, MASS SURVEILLANCE,
AND THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM THE NSA 4 (Brookings Inst. Press 2017). The concern
was global, with other nations expressing similar fears of terrorist attacks, culminating in
the multilateral cooperation between nations exchanging data and information in the
interest of keeping those within their borders safe. Id.
80. See EDGAR, supra note 79, at 8.
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future attacks or for gathering information on the perpetrators of
a past attack.81 The events and aftermath of two distinct terrorist
attacks in the United States vindicates these national security
concerns.
On December 2, 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen
Malik walked into a holiday party at a social services center in San
Bernardino, California, and killed fourteen people while injuring
twenty-one others.82 The Islamic State, a militant terrorist group
based in Iraq and Syria, quickly took credit for the attack, though
there was no evidence directly linking the shooters to the group.83
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) recovered Farook’s
iPhone and with Apple’s assistance was able to recover iCloud
data that was backed up through October 19, leaving six weeks of
data unaccounted for.84 The FBI sought further help from Apple
in extracting the remaining data, but Apple refused, explaining it
would not write code that allows the FBI to bypass the phone’s
encryption measures.85 The FBI sought a judgment to compel
Apple to write code that would permit backdoor access to the
81. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. William P. Barr, Keynote Address at the International
Conference on Cyber Security 1, 5 (July 23, 2019); Lee & Pearlman, supra note 28, at
786; Dunlap, supra note 13, at 1697.
82. See Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Is Treating Rampage as Act
TIMES,
Dec.
5,
2015,
at
A1,
of
Terrorism,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html
[https://perma.cc/7XJL-98TD]; Alex Dobuzinskis, In San Bernardino, solemn ceremony
marks mass shooting, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscalifornia-shooting-anniversary/in-san-bernardino-solemn-ceremony-marks-massshooting-idUSKBN13R13R [https://perma.cc/ZV8J-XTEM].
83. See Laura Wagner, Still No Evidence Linking San Bernardino Shooters to ISIS, FBI
Says,
NPR
(Dec.
16,
2015),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2015/12/16/460021165/still-no-evidence-linking-san-bernardino-shooters-to-isisfbi-says [https://perma.cc/VAE5-ANAA].
84. See Ellen Nakashima & Mark Berman, FBI asked San Bernardino to reset the
2016),
password for shooter’s phone backup, WASH. POST (Feb. 20,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-asked-san-bernardinoto-reset-the-password-for-shooters-phone-backup/2016/02/20/21fe9684-d800-11e5be55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q8PN-UYGJ].
85. See Ellen Nakashima, Why Apple is in a historic fight with the government over one
iPhone, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/why-apple-is-in-a-historic-fight-with-the-government-over-oneiphone/2016/02/17/c512c9ba-d59b-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html
[https://perma.cc/FZ76-QZYV]; see Leander Kahney, The FBI Wanted a Back Door to the
MAG.
(Apr.
16,
2019),
iPhone.
Tim
Cook
Said
No,
WIRED
https://www.wired.com/story/the-time-tim-cook-stood-his-ground-against-fbi/
[https://perma.cc/H69Z-CH28].
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phone,86 but dropped the case a few months later after reportedly
paying a third-party company over US$1.3 million to hack the
phone.87 The FBI did not reveal whether the extracted
information was useful.88
The US government encountered this problem again more
recently in January 2020 when it recovered two iPhones
belonging to a suspected terrorist, and was again unable to access
the iPhones’ password-protected contents.89 On December 8,
2019, Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani went on a shooting rampage
at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida.90 Apple turned over
the relevant data that was in its possession, but again stated it was
unable to access the data on the locked, encrypted iPhone, and
that it would not write code permitting backdoor access into the
device.91 More than four months later in May 2020, the FBI
managed to access the data through an alternative method,92 and
found evidence of Alshamrani’s connection with al-Qaida.93

86. The case and other judicial opinions will be analyzed later on in this Note. See
infra Part IV.
87. See Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, F.B.I. Director Suggests Bill for an iPhone
Hacking Topped $1.3 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2016, at B3,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/us/politics/fbi-director-suggests-bill-foriphone-hacking-was-1-3-million.html [https://perma.cc/8V4W-49K6]; Katie Benner &
Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked an iPhone Without Apple, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2016, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphone-fbijustice-department-case.html [https://perma.cc/GU6A-WKME].
88. See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Lawyer Won’t Say If Data from Unlocked iPhone is Useful,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2016, at B3. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/technology/fbilawyer-wont-say-if-data-from-unlocked-iphone-is-useful.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/DMR4-6BD7].
89. See Shannon Bond, Apple Declines DOJ Request to Unlock Pensacola Gunman’s
Phones, NPR (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/14/796160524/appledeclines-doj-request-to-unlock-pensacola-gunmans-phones
[https://perma.cc/D9PE8YMB]; Jack Nicas & Katie Benner, F.B.I. Asks Apple To Help Unlock Two iPhones, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2020, at B7, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/technology/applefbi-iphone-encryption.html [https://perma.cc/T9P8-96GM].
90. See Laurel Wamsley, FBI Is Investigating Pensacola Shooting As Terrorism, NPR
(Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/08/786089099/fbi-is-investigatingpensacola-shooting-as-terrorism [https://perma.cc/D46X-C2KC].
91. See id.; Bond, supra note 89.
92. See Kevin Collier & Cyrus Favirar, The FBI cracked another iPhone – but it’s still not
NEWS
(May
18,
2020),
happy
with
Apple,
NBC
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/fbi-cracked-another-iphone-it-s-still-nothappy-apple-n1209506 [https://perma.cc/F2GV-VB8E].
93. Hannah Allam, FBI: New iPhone Evidence Shows Pensacola Shooter Had Ties To AlQaida, NPR (May 18, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/18/857932909/fbi-new-
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In both scenarios, in response to the US government’s
requests to decrypt the smartphones, Apple stated it could not do
so because it did not have the decryption key. Further, Apple
refused to comply with requests to write code to allow for
backdoor access, citing privacy and cybersecurity concerns.94
Ultimately, in both cases, the US government used other methods
to access the encrypted data, much to the chagrin of government
officials who were not content with the limited solution given that
its delay and expense hindered national security investigations.95
The US federal government is not the only government
entity citing national security concerns for gaining access to data
on the encrypted smartphones. After a series of terrorist attacks
in 2017, the British government expressed frustration at not
being able to investigate the encrypted communications of the
attackers.96 Likewise, France and Germany have been vocal about
changing EU laws regarding law enforcement access to encrypted
device data after suffering numerous terrorist attacks with death
tolls of over 200.97 Australia, despite having not suffered a recent
terrorist attack on the scale of those in these three mentioned
countries, still cites national security concerns to justify provisions
in its new law that may require technology companies to provide
the Australian government access to encrypted data.98 Lastly,

iphone-evidence-shows-pensacola-shooter-had-ties-to-al-qaida [https://perma.cc/ZJ6NQ2AD].
94. See Kahney, supra note 85.
95. See Collier & Favirar, supra note 92; Nicas & Benner, supra note 89.
96. See Mark Scott, Britain Demands Keys to Encrypted Messaging After London Attack,
TIMES,
Mar.
28,
2017,
at
B5,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/technology/whatsapp-rudd-terrorists-ukattack.html [https://perma.cc/4X5C-93FD]. Britain’s home secretary, Amber Rudd,
explained that the British intelligence agencies were having trouble accessing encrypted
messages sent through WhatsApp. Id. WhatsApp uses end-to-end encryption, which is
different than the encryption focused on here, but the context is still important for this
Note’s analysis. See Leo Kelion, WhatsApp’s privacy protections questioned after terror attack,
BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39405178
[https://perma.cc/XL4W-FHFY].
97. See Natasha Lomas, Encryption under fire in Europe as France and Germany call for
(Aug.
24,
2016),
decrypt
law,
TECHCRUNCH
https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/24/encryption-under-fire-in-europe-as-france-andgermany-call-for-decrypt-law/ [https://perma.cc/9QP9-WKGP]; Manpearl, supra note
20, at 181.
98. See Nellie Bowles, Did Australia Poke Hoke in Your Phone’s Security?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2019, at B1, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/technology/australia-
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recent laws passed in China, like the Counterterrorism Law,
indicate that the Chinese government places a premium on
smartphone data.99 Given that countries often look to each other
to formulate domestic policies, the debate in the United States on
whether national security concerns justify government access to
encrypted data likely has global implications.100
2. Local Crimes
Accessing data-at-rest on iPhones is also an important goal
for local law enforcement agencies given that the information is
just as likely to be helpful in resolving crimes unrelated to
national security.101 Recovered data can reveal information on the
motivations and actions of any perpetrator, not just terrorists.
Cyrus Vance, the Manhattan District Attorney and a strong
advocate for data access, argues that smartphone data can be used
to provide probative evidence in local crimes such as murders and
serious injuries.102 To illustrate, text message exchanges that were
stored only on a smartphone were key evidence the Los Angeles
Police Department used to convict two parents for the death of
their two-year old daughter.103 In another case, a long-haul
trucker was convicted for sexual assault and kidnapping after law
enforcement officials recovered video evidence of the assault
from his cell phone.104 A third case involves the unsolved murder
of a father of six, in which the only evidence was a locked iPhone
6 and a Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge that were found beside his
body.105 Though this type of evidence can be as critical to local
cellphone-encryption-security.html [https://perma.cc/QXH6-PK8S]. A more thorough
discussion of Australian laws will be in Section III.B.
99. See Lorand Laskai & Adam Segal, The Encryption Debate in China, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE 8 (May 30, 2019).
100. See Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As encryption spreads, U.S. grapples with
POST
(Apr.
10,
2015),
clash
between
privacy,
security,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-encryption-spreads-usworries-about-access-to-data-for-investigations/2015/04/10/7c1c7518-d401-11e4-a62fee745911a4ff_story.html [https://perma.cc/5BFL-V3X4].
101. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 163.
102. See VANCE 2016, supra note 16, at 8.
103. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 577.
104. See Nakashima & Gellman, supra note 100.
105. See Cyrus R. Vance Jr. et al., When Phone Encryption Blocks Justice, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/opinion/apple-google-whenphone-encryption-blocks-justice.html [https://perma.cc/VA3G-VZJR].
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groups in the prevention and resolution of crime, the agencies
that need them are less likely to have the financial resources of
the federal government to unlock the smartphones that contain
them.106 Moreover, law enforcement in smaller, local jurisdictions
are more likely to encounter locked smartphones without the
resources to unlock them.107
Other countries echo the need to use this data to solve locallevel crimes. British Prime Minister David Cameron expressed,
“[t]his vital communications data is absolutely crucial not just to
fight terrorism but finding missing people, murder
investigations.”108 Australia’s Department of Home Affairs,
likewise, expressed concerns on the effect that encryption has on
law enforcements’ ability to address organized crime, smuggling,
and the sexual exploitation of children.109 Local law enforcement
agencies’ need for data from encrypted smartphones is globally
apparent.
3. Sexual Exploitation of Minors
Preventing the sexual exploitation of children is a special use
case for decryption and stands apart from the concerns outlined
above in that this interest regards a vulnerable population that
the United States historically has vigorously protected.110 A 2019
investigation by The New York Times revealed how child abusers
and sexual predators exploit encryption technology to perpetrate
their crimes.111 Images are shared through encrypted
106. See Manpearl II, supra note 75, at 74.
107. See id. at 77. MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION
AND
PUBLIC
SAFETY
4-5
(2017),
https://www.manhattanda.org/wpcontent/themes/dany/files/2017%20Report%20of%20the%20Manhattan%20District%
20Attorney%27s%20Office%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryption.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5D8D-G2RD] [hereinafter VANCE 2017].
108. See Rowena Mason, UK spy agencies need more powers, says Cameron, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/12/uk-spy-agenciesneed-more-powers-says-cameron-paris-attacks [https://perma.cc/79ZK-XET8].
109. See Stilgherrian, The Encryption Debate in Australia, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT’L PEACE (2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/30/encryption-debatein-australia-pub-79217 [https://perma.cc/PGP6-TZLC].
110. See Lawless Spaces: Warrant-proof Encryption and its Impact on Child Exploitation
Cases, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 6, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/olp/lawless-spaceswarrant-proof-encryption-and-its-impact-child-exploitation-cases
[https://perma.cc/U6VU-WYXP] (last updated Dec. 6, 2019).
111. See Michael Keller & Gabriel Dance, The Internet Is Overrun With Images of Child
TIMES
(Sept.
29,
2019),
Sexual
Abuse.
What
Went
Wrong?,
N.Y.
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communications and stored on encrypted devices.112 At present,
technology companies report the images only when they discover
them and otherwise have no legal obligation to look for them on
their platforms.113 On its products, Apple purports to use image
matching technology to find images that are sent in
transmission,114 though it is unclear if that technology can be used
to preemptively scan images that are stored on the phone and not
sent in transmission.
US government officials frame encrypted communications
and devices as a “law free zone” where predators may store images
without the scrutiny of the criminal justice system.115 To
government officials, by increasing encryption options,
technology companies take a step back from alleviating the

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/J7W3-WA28]. The piece focused on Facebook and its efforts in
combatting sexual exploitation of children on its platform. Prior to switching to end-toend encryption, Facebook actively monitored messages sent through its messaging
platform and would report any child pornography to the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children. Since shifting to end-to-end encryption, its investigative
mechanisms are limited by encryption because it cannot fully investigate encrypted
communications for which it does not have a decryption key. That said, it continues to
report images upon discovery and to develop technology that detects exploitative
content. See Community Standards: Child Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Nudity, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/child_nudity_sexual_exploitation
[https://perma.cc/TFK3-BDL6] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); Antigone Davis, New
Technology
to
Fight
Child
Exploitation,
FACEBOOK
(Oct.
24,
2018),
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/10/fighting-child-exploitation/
[https://perma.cc/3YZH-KX24].
112. See Keller & Dance, supra note 111; Christopher Wray, Finding a Way Forward
on Lawful Access: Bringing Child Predators out of the Shadows, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/finding-a-way-forward-on-lawfulaccess [https://perma.cc/86HX-SDWE].
113. See Keller & Dance, supra note 111; see also Katie Benner & Mike Isaac, ChildWelfare Activists Attack Facebook Over Encryption Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/technology/facebook-encryption-childexploitation.html [https://perma.cc/7K6F-EKYA].
114. See Our Commitment to Child Safety, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/childsafety/en-ww/ [https://perma.cc/3LFX-94WM] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
115. See William Barr, Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks at the Lawful
DEP’T
JUST.
(Oct.
4,
2019),
Access
Summit,
U.S.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarkslawful-access-summit [https://perma.cc/RM64-CG9D]; see also Dunlap, supra note 13, at
1698; Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 571 (“John J. Escalante, former Chief of Detectives for
Chicago’s Police Department predicts that Apple will become the phone of choice for
the pedophile.”) (internal citations omitted).
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problem.116 The evidence stored on smartphones could help
identify victims and prevent further harms to unidentified child
victims.117 Exploitative materials can be stored on smartphones
without ever being transmitted, and oftentimes, can be the only
evidence of wrongdoing.118 More, images depicting the sexual
exploitation of children can cross international borders when
such images are transmitted to different countries.119 Other
countries, such as Australia, are raising the alarm that encryption
technology impedes efforts to tackle and end child sexual
exploitation.120 In the words of Facebook’s founder, Mark
Zuckerberg, “[e]ncryption is a powerful tool for privacy but that
includes the privacy of people doing bad things.”121
C. Extraordinary Access and Lawful Hacking
As explained in Section II.B above, criminal investigations
are frustrated when law enforcement officials cannot access what
might be potentially crucial data on an iPhone.122 In response to
the limitations created by device encryption, law enforcement
agencies have pursued two technological methods, each with
important legal implications. The first method, termed
“extraordinary access,” refers to the government, sometimes with
the assistance of a technology company, accessing the data on a
smartphone without external complications.123 The second
method, termed “lawful hacking,” refers to exploiting existing
loopholes in the software to instead hack into the smartphone.124
The critical difference between the two, as will be explained in
this Section, is that while the first method is more akin to having
a skeleton key for any house, the second is more like being locked
116. See Barr, supra note 115.
117. See Jeffrey Rosen, Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen Delivers Remarks at
Justice Department’s Lawful Access Summit, U.S. DEP’T. JUST. (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-jeffrey-rosen-deliversremarks-justice-departments-lawful-access [https://perma.cc/9SCT-62EH].
118. See Barr, supra note 115.
119. See id.
120. See Julie I. Grant & Jon Rouse, The rush to encrypt . . . and its unintended victims,
OFF. ESAFETY COMM’R (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.esafety.gov.au/about-us/blog/rushencryptand-its-unintended-victims [https://perma.cc/YFH4-GSFK].
121. See Keller & Dance, supra note 111.
122. See Kahney, supra note 85; discussion supra Section II.B.
123. See Levy, supra note 15; Bellovin, supra note 15, at 1.
124. See Levy, supra note 15 (reporting on lawful hacking and its implications).
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out and having to pick the lock with a bobby pin or breaking a
window to get inside a single house. Given this difference, two
threshold issues arise: first, gaining the assistance of a technology
company to create the skeleton key, and second, working around
the privacy concerns raised by intruding into an otherwise private
space.
Extraordinary access, sometimes called exceptional access,
has been referred to as a “backdoor” for the government.125 The
access is characterized as extraordinary and exceptional because
the government would only use the tool to access targeted phones
as opposed to a more dragnet type of data collection.126 Though
there are several ways to accomplish this, the basic idea is to
provide the government a way to access data on an encrypted
smartphone without having to resort to other more intensive
methods.127 To illustrate, a government can push a software
update to the targeted iPhone to remove the encryption code
altogether.128 Alternatively, a technology company can build
intentional vulnerabilities into its software for all its devices to
then provide special permissions to the appropriate law
enforcement agencies.129
Backdoors provide the government with a long-term solution
to the problem of encrypted smartphones because they would
allow for an investigating law enforcement official to access the
information without incurring additional expenses. A backdoor
would have saved the FBI the US$1.3 million it reportedly spent
on unlocking Syed Farook’s iPhone.130 That said, to use a
backdoor, the government would need cooperation from the
technology company, who would then have to alter the
encryption code to provide a law enforcement official backdoor
access to the phone. But, technology companies are resistant to
providing the government with backdoor access that could
effectively be used to decrypt any smartphone.131 Doing so gives
rise to serious cybersecurity and privacy implications because

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See Traylor, supra note 27, at 497.
See Levy, supra note 15.
See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 2.
See VANCE 2016, supra note 16, at 15.
See id.
See Lichtblau & Benner, supra note 87.
See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 166.
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providing a backdoor weakens any encrypted ensured security.132
Backdoors can undermine the security of encryption measures
and leave smartphones vulnerable to malicious third parties like
hackers or foreign nations.133 Thus, without voluntary
cooperation from the technology company, a government would
have to use its existing legal framework or amend the relevant
provisions to compel the company into providing the requested
technical assistance.134
In contrast to extraordinary access, the government can use
its own resources or hire a third-party to “lawfully hack” the
encryption code without the technical assistance from the
technology company.135 The hacking is considered lawful because
the action is authorized by the government, regardless of who
ultimately does the hacking.136 Technology companies themselves
do not engage in lawful hacking because it would undermine
their claims that their devices are secure.137 Rather than installing
a backdoor, lawful hacking exploits existing vulnerabilities on the
phone.138 This could mean that the hacker identifies a loophole
in the encryption code that would allow him to bypass the security
measures.139 It also could refer to less complex methods by using
brute-force methods and trying thousands of password
combinations to gain access into the encrypted device.140 Using
the analogy above, lawful hacking can include anything from
wiggling a loose doorknob until it falls off or using more forceful
methods like smashing in a window to gain entry into the house.

132. See id.; Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 3.
133. See discussion supra Section II.A.
134. A discussion of how other countries have already amended their laws to
compel backdoor access is in Part III, and a discussion of the US government’s process
is in Part IV.
135. See Manpearl II, supra note 75, at 83.
136. Daniel Zhang, Revisit the Case for Lawful Hacking: A Path to the Going Dark Debate,
SEC.
STUD.
REV.
(Dec.
13,
2019),
GEO.
https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2019/12/13/revisit-the-case-for-lawfulhacking-a-path-to-the-going-dark-debate/ [https://perma.cc/W7FC-HBDT].
137. Ian Levy & Crispin Robinson, Principles for a More Informed Exceptional Access
Debate, LAWFARE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/principles-moreinformed-exceptional-access-debate [https://perma.cc/P7AB-XR27].
138. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 27.
139. Id.
140. See Kerr, Preliminary thoughts, supra note 68.
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Unlike backdoor access, which would create a key to every phone,
lawful hacking compromises only its target.141
Lawful hacking is a short-term solution to the problem of
encrypted smartphones because a government is forced to
expend time and money on a case-by-case basis.142 Instead of
having the capability of accessing every phone as it needs to, a law
enforcement agency must be more selective in the phones it
targets. Governments are hesitant to use lawful hacking because
it often requires hiring a third-party skilled in decryption who can
demand a high price tag for the service.143 Or, if the government
were to use its own resources, it may instead encounter delays on
otherwise time-sensitive matters.144 In short, what is gained by
using lawful hacking—bypassing the need for cooperation from
the technology company—comes with a price, and efforts are
limited only to specific devices given the increased cost and
longer wait times.
These
complications
regarding
lawful
hacking,
consequently, limit the government from gaining access to every
phone. Still, consumers rely on devices promising strong
encryption measures to secure personal information from prying
eyes (including those of the government). Those who value
privacy as a method of control and protection from government
surveillance may want to use encryption to minimize against
government abuses.145 For these individuals, lawful hacking
undermines the privacy guaranteed by encryption measures,
especially when the information collected from the hacking goes
beyond what is reasonable. The reaction from the Snowden
disclosures, for example, demonstrates that even authorized
hacking can pervasively intrude upon an individual’s sphere of
privacy.146 In critiquing the role of lawful hacking in the global
Encryption Debate, the legal implications center more around
the privacy expectations of the average user.147

141. But see Dunlap, supra note 13, at 1697.
142. See VANCE 2017, supra note 107, at 2.
143. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 586.
144. See id.
145. See supra Section II.A.1.
146. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 116.
147. In the United States, this is associated with the Fourth Amendment
protections. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 24.
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This tension between encryption and legitimate government
interests is global.148 Mobile phones are ubiquitous, with a
significant number of devices capable of collecting vast amounts
of data about its user.149 Apple, in particular, is one of the largest
providers of smartphones with full disk encryption, and as of 2017
holds approximately thirteen percent of the global market
running iOS 8 or higher.150 In the United States, approximately
forty-four percent of all mobile devices run iOS.151 Moreover, as
explained earlier, the different types of crime are not limited to
one area of the world, and because of this, countries may mirror
each other with the laws they ultimately enact to regulate the use
of encryption.152 Underlying the Encryption Debate is the
awareness that however the debate is tackled in each country, that
choice affects the global community.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE LEGAL INTERNATIONAL
LANDSCAPE
Several countries have attempted to address these two issues
in their respective legal frameworks. This Part focuses on the
approaches adopted by the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany,
and China. In addition to being the most vocal on the debate,
these countries provide benchmarks on balancing the interests of
law enforcement and those of technology companies and privacy
advocates. The United Kingdom and Australia are members of
the Five-Eyes Alliance (“FVEY”)—countries that place a high
value on developing tools and improving international
coordination in addressing transnational crime.153 Germany, in

148. See CARNEGIE, supra note 12, at 1.
149. JAMES A. LEWIS ET AL., THE EFFECT OF ENCRYPTION ON LAWFUL ACCESS TO
COMMUNICATIONS
AND
DATA
18
(2017), https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-humantrafficking/encryption/csis_study_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4P7-YNJM].
150. Id. at 8.
151. Id.
152. Denis McGonough, Toward a More Constructive Encryption Debate, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
FOR
INT’L
PEACE
(Apr.
25,
2019),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/25/toward-more-constructive-encryptiondebate-pub-79006 [https://perma.cc/VQ4N-KMB5].
153. The alliance is made up of the United States, Australia, New Zealand and
Canada. FVEY is a creation of a series of formal bilateral agreements encouraging
collaboration on international crime and government surveillance techniques. See
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contrast, prioritizes user privacy above state interests. Last, China
provides a unique perspective on the Debate by instead choosing
to minimize the influence of technology companies and foreign
states.
A. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom passed explicit laws governing law
enforcement’s relationship with data and encryption: the 2016
Investigatory Powers Act (“IPA”)154 and the 2018 Data Protection
Act (“DPA”).155 The IPA instructs law enforcement agencies on
when they can compel technology companies to facilitate
encrypted data access and when they can use lawful hacking
methods. The DPA, on the other hand, regulates law
enforcement agencies’ collection and processing of personal
data. Both laws are relatively recent and UK courts have yet to
fully implement either act. Thus, interpretive guidance on both
laws is sparse.
1. The Investigatory Powers Act
The 2016 IPA provides the legal framework that governs a
law enforcement agency’s power to investigate crime.156 The IPA
was meant to consolidate existing powers into a comprehensive
resource, but its passage brought out concerns about the
potential for arbitrary and pervasive use.157 The investigative
methods that some provisions authorize are highly intrusive in
nature and necessitate securing authorization from both the
Secretary of State and an independent judge prior to their use.158

Rachel Taylor, Intelligence-Sharing Agreements & International Data Protection: Avoiding A
Global Surveillance State, 17 WASH U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 731, 733 (2018).
154. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25 (UK).
155. Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12 (UK).
156. Confidentiality, Freedom of Information and Data Protection, P.L. Apr. 2017,
293-296 (2017).
157. Stuart MacLennan & Steve Foster, Comment, R. (on the application of Liberty) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, 23(1) COVENTRY L. J. 105, 110 (2018); Matt Burgess, What is the IP Act and how will
it affect you?, WIRED MAG. (May 8, 2017), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ip-bill-lawdetails-passed [https://perma.cc/ZSL6-YLGV].
158. Levy & Robinson, supra note 137.
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Further, the IPA can only be used to investigate serious crimes.159
Serious crimes are defined to be those that carry a prison
sentence of twelve months.160 Last, the IPA sustains broad
coverage and applies to foreign companies that conduct business
in the United Kingdom.161
Section 253 of the IPA allows the government to compel
technology companies to assist in accessing decrypted data.162
Under the IPA, law enforcement agencies must secure a warrant
before they can serve a technical capability notice (“TCN”) on a
telecommunications operator.163 After securing the warrant, the
TCN can be used to compel technology companies to remove
protections on the sought data.164 The demand for extraordinary
access comes from statutory language, which imposes
“obligations relating to the removal by a relevant operator of
electronic protection applied by or on behalf of that operator to
any communications or data.”165 Though TCNs can be deployed
to compel decryption by companies who may already have
encryption keys for their products, it is unclear whether they can
be used to compel companies without such keys, like Apple,166 for
whom decryption would require redesigning their systems to
comply with the notice.167 Additionally, a TCN can be used to
compel companies to install a “permanent interception
capability” which ensures future access to encrypted data.168 This
provision has yet to be invoked.169

159. After being challenged in UK courts for overbroad provisions, the IPA was
amended by the Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018, to define serious
crimes as offenses that carry a minimum of twelve months of imprisonment. The Data
Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018, SI 2018/1123 (Eng.).
160. Id.
161. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 42; Manpearl, supra note 20, at 206.
162. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 34; Manpearl, supra note 20, at 199.
163. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 253 (UK).
164. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 200.
165. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 253(5)(c) (UK).
166. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 201.
167. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 200.
168. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 37.
169. See Alex Hern, UK government can force encryption removal, but fears losing, experts
(Mar.
29,
2017),
say,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/29/uk-government-encryptionwhatsapp-investigatory-powers-act [https://perma.cc/472W-MSJG].
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Part 5 of the IPA authorizes “lawful hacking” by law
enforcement agencies.170 Like the requirements for extraordinary
access, a law enforcement agency must secure a warrant before it
can hack into the device.171 Under this provision, the government
issues targeted equipment interference warrants.172 Warrants can
be served on either the equipment owner or on an operator to
assist in decrypting the data.173 Law enforcement can use these
warrants to access all types of data on a phone including
communications data, speech, music, sounds, and images.174
Unlike the TCN, equipment interference warrants can only be
used on devices that law enforcement agencies reasonably believe
contain information vital to national security interests or are
related to the objective of investigating and solving a serious
crime.175
To determine whether law enforcement can use either
provision of the IPA, the warrant issuer must evaluate whether the
government’s objective in doing so is important and legitimate.176
This is a low bar and turns on the type of crime the IPA is being
used to address.177 Once the agency passes this bar, the IPA must
be implemented according to the principles of necessity and
proportionality.178 The necessity principle requires courts to
consider whether there are less intrusive measures available to the
government.179 The proportionality principle requires courts to
consider whether the government’s proposed actions are
narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal, i.e. whether the
implicated right would be limited any more than is necessary to
accomplish the objective.180 The “necessity and proportionality”
analysis is meant as a procedural safeguard given the potential for
government abuse.181

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 5 (UK).
Id.
See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 203.
See id.
See Sybil Gilbert, Someone to watch over me, 23 COVENTRY L.J. 76, 83 (2018).
See Confidentiality, supra note 156.
See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 39.
See id. at 38.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See MacLennan & Foster, supra note 157.
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2. The Data Protection Act & Privacy Expectations for Mobile
Data
Privacy expectations in the United Kingdom come from
different sectors of the law,182 like that in the United States.183 In
Wainwright v Home Office,184 the House of Lords held that there is
no general right to privacy in English common law.185 Rather,
parties seeking to make claims based on a violation of privacy
must seek recourse from other legislation.186 The Data Protection
Act of 2018 is the latest piece of legislation in the UK data
protection legal regime, and the primary piece of legislation used
for claims alleging intrusion of privacy of personal data. Though
most of the law is the United Kingdom’s implementation of the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), the relevant
DPA provision for this Note adopts European Directive
2016/680.187 Part 3 of the DPA dictates how law enforcement
agencies collect and process data.
There are six data protection principles that must be met for
a law enforcement agency to apply when processing data:
•

Processing be lawful and fair;

•

The purposes of processing be specified, explicit and
legitimate;

•

Personal data be adequate, relevant and not
excessive;

•

Personal data be accurate and kept up to date;

•

Personal data be kept no longer than is necessary;
and

•

Personal data be processed in a secure manner.188

182. David Lindsay, An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the
Implications for the Future of Australian Privacy Law, 29 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 131, 132
(2005).
183. See infra Part IV.
184. Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 54, [2004] 2 A.C. 406.
185. See N.A. Moreham, Beyond information: physical privacy in English law, 73(2)
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 350-77 (2014).
186. See id. at 364. Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights for example, could be used to obligate the United Kingdom to protect
citizens from the misuse of data by private actors. Id. at 357.
187. Council Directive 2016/680, 2016 O.J. (L 119/89).
188. DEP’T FOR DIG., CULTURE MEDIA & SPORT, DATA PROT. ACT FACTSHEET (2018),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
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Individuals whose data is being collected have rights such as:
the right to knowledge of how the data is being processed; the
right to rectify inaccurate data, the right to the erasure or
restriction of data “where the processing of the data would
infringe the data protection principles,” and rights related to
automated decision-making.”189 Lastly, these individuals’ rights
can be limited, but only where necessary and proportionate.190
Though the DPA is intended to be the United Kingdom’s
local implementation of the GDPR, the adoption of EU Directive
2016/680 through Part 3 was meant to ensure that even public
officials such as law enforcement officers exercise caution in
collecting and processing data.191 The first principle, for example,
recognizes that not all data collection is essential and law
enforcement must show that the data could not be accessed by
some other less intrusive means.192 The third principle likewise
requires that the data collected is adequate and limited to only
what is necessary—the DPA does not permit a broad collection
and retention of collected data.193 Last, any data processing is
subject to a “necessity and proportionality” analysis and must be
applied to any law enforcement action conducted pursuant to the
IPA.194
3. Application of the UK Legal Regime to Encrypted
Smartphones
British citizens expressed displeasure about the IPA even
before its passage, and referred to it as the “Snoopers’ Charter”
because of the expansive power given to the government to
collect and investigate private and sensitive data from

ment_data/file/711215/2018-05-23_Factsheet_3_-_law_enforcement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G5JP-K9AV] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. About the DPA 2018, INFO. COMM’R OFF., https://ico.org.uk/fororganisations/guide-to-data-protection/introduction-to-data-protection/about-the-dpa2018/ [https://perma.cc/M7NE-L99U] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
192. See ICO Guide to Law Enforcement Processing, INFO. COMM’R OFF.,
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-lawenforcement-processing/ [https://perma.cc/C8GD-NY74] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
193. See id.
194. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 38.
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smartphones.195 The IPA stands starkly in contrast to the DPA,
which promises a reasonable expectation of privacy from law
enforcement and government surveillance. Both acts utilize a
necessity and proportionality test to determine whether the access
at issue is justified.
Whether it is used to secure information about a terrorist
network or to gather information about a drug deal, gathering
evidence in criminal investigations is an important and legitimate
state objective. This objective surpasses the low threshold
required by the IPA. A law enforcement agency that wants to
lawfully hack into a phone must determine first whether there are
less intrusive measures available to gain access. Given the amount
of time and money it costs to access the phone, it is likely a warrant
issuer will determine that there are no less intrusive measures
available to gather the desired information. Further, these same
reasons suggest that the government’s proposed actions are
narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal. Lastly, the principles
articulated in the DPA serve as a bulwark against overbroad
searches. Law enforcement can only collect and retain essential
data and must dispose of anything non-essential. Seemingly, in
the United Kingdom, a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy
is protected by procedural safeguards that ensure that only
relevant data is being collected and investigated.
B. Australia
Though an established member of the FVEY security and
global surveillance alliance, Australia has the newest set of laws in
the Encryption Debate.196 Thus far, Australian federal law on
encryption and privacy rights in the digital age is largely
controlled by a single piece of legislation: the 2018
Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment

195. See Jillian Ventura, Snoopers’ Charter: Extreme Surveillance Becomes UK Law,
LAWFARE (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/snoopers-charter-extremesurveillance-becomes-uk-law [https://perma.cc/259Q-BF8E]. Edward Snowden also
commented on the overbroad powers given with the IPA. Edward Snowden
(Nov.
4,
2015,
8:59
AM),
(@Snowden),
TWITTER
https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/661950808381128704 [https://perma.cc/6KQSKUZB].
196. Stilgherrian, supra note 109.
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(Assistance and Access) Bill (“AAB”).197 The law acts similarly to
the UK laws because it explicitly requires communications and
service providers to develop new capabilities to intercept
communications, authorizes a law enforcement agency to hack
into the device, and requires foreign companies to comply when
operating in Australia.198 However, unlike the UK, Australia does
not have a federal statutory scheme that protects individuals from
overbroad law enforcement surveillance. Instead, that protection
comes from state governments, though only one state has so-far
acted in providing such protections.199
1. The Assistance and Access Bill
The AAB created a procedural mechanism whereby law
enforcement must go through proper channels before issuing a
technology capability notice on any entity that provides online
services or communications equipment in Australia.200 This law
functions similarly to the UK’s IPA, and evokes many of the same
concerns. TCNs may compel a company to either use existing
capabilities to remove electronic protection or install new
capabilities to do so.201 The type of help that a law enforcement
agency can request from a technology company is outlined in
Schedule 1 (“Industry Assistance”) and the warrant process is
explained in Schedule 2 (“Computer Access Warrants”).202
Though parts of the bill suggest otherwise, the Australian
government, through the inclusion of Section 317ZG, remains
197.
198.
199.
200.

See id.
See id.
See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
See MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY (2019),
https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-Report-onSmartphone-Encryption-and-Public-Safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NL4-RZCZ]; Kelly
Buchanan, Australia: Bill Enabling Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies to Access
CONG.
(Dec.
14,
2018),
Encrypted
Information
Passes,
LIBR.
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/australia-bill-enabling-law-enforcementand-intelligence-agencies-to-access-encrypted-information-passes/
[https://perma.cc/R2KS-TUT8].
201. See Buchanan, supra note 200; Jennifer Daskal, Privacy and Security Across
Borders, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 1029, 1040 (2019).
HOME
AFFAIRS,
202. See
Assistance
and
Access:
Overview,
DEP’T
https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/lawfulaccess-telecommunications/assistance-and-access-overview [https://perma.cc/8UUEYQCP] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
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resolute that the bill cannot and will not be used to compel
companies to provide extraordinary access by creating backdoors
because this would undermine information security.203 Instead,
the technical assistance must be “reasonable, proportionate,
practicable and technically feasible.”204 The technical assistance
cannot remove existing electronic protection.205 Additionally, the
AAB can only be used on crimes that have a maximum penalty of
at least three years imprisonment or more, which effectively
precludes the use of the law for lesser offenses.206 For the
Australian government, compelling companies to provide
technical assistance in retrieving data from smartphones is
justified by the legitimate need of law enforcement to solve
crime.207 The country, however, draws the line at modifying
technology such that it would weaken the security system of the
device.208
2. Australian Expectations of Privacy
Australia does not have one comprehensive law discussing
privacy—rather, like the UK, an Australian citizen’s right to
privacy is inferred from an amalgamation of federal, state, and
territory laws.209 The Australia federal government has not
codified any protections from government surveillance, and
instead such protections have come from individual states. At
least two states, New South Wales and Queensland, provide some
insight into how Australian law might address the issues proposed
by the Encryption Debate. Given the state-based nature of privacy
protections and the recency of the digital privacy legislation, it is
unknown how exactly these interplay with the AAB.

203. See Assistance and Access: Common myths and misconceptions, DEP’T HOME AFFAIRS,
https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/lawfulaccess-telecommunications/myths-assistance-access-act [https://perma.cc/7RLJ-HK6K]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
204. See Assistance and Access: Overview, supra note 202.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Kelly Buchanan, Online Privacy Law: Australia, LIBR. CONG. (Dec. 2017),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-privacy-law/2017/australia.php
[https://perma.cc/8R8Y-VELF].
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New South Wales uses the Law Enforcement (Powers and
Responsibilities) Act of 2002 (“LEPRA”)210 as the primary
protection against unlawful police action. LEPRA Section 30
comes closest to addressing the search of a mobile phone during
a police encounter and states in relevant part, “In conducting the
search of a person, a police officer may . . . (c) examine anything
in the possession of the person, and . . . (e) do any other thing
authorized by this Act for the purposes of the search.”211 This
provision could be interpreted to allow a police officer to search
a cell phone, though it is not explicit in the text whether this type
of search was contemplated by the NSW legislature when it passed
the Act in 2002.
Queensland, on the other hand, has substantial statutory
authority and case law elaborating when law enforcement can
access data on a lawfully seized smartphone. The Police Powers
and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) (the “PPRA”) dictates the
contours of lawful searches and seizures.212 The PPRA recognizes
two types of situations necessitating lawful hacking: 1) when the
perpetrator’s identity is known and 2) when an unknown phone
is recovered from a crime scene.213 In both instances, the targeted
phone must be linked to a crime, which provides sufficient
justification to secure a warrant to hack into the phone. The
PPRA discusses two types of warrants issued to allow law
enforcement to access the data on a locked smartphone.214
Section 154 warrants are issued when the phone owner’s
identity is known.215 The warrant compels the owner to provide
information necessary to access the phone.216 Failure to provide
such information is a crime, the penalty for which is two to fiveyears imprisonment.217 Though this raises concerns of self-

210. Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act, 2002 (Act No. 103.2002)
(NSW) [hereinafter LEPRA].
211. Id. § 30.
212. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000 (Qld) §§ 5, 7 [hereinafter PPRA].
213. PPRA § 154.
214. PPRA § 178A.
215. See Matthew Raj & Russ Marshall, Examining the Legitimacy of Police Power to
Search Portable Electronic Devices in Queensland, 38 U. QUEENSL. L. J. 99, 118 (2019).
216. See id.
217. See id.
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incrimination, Australia does not recognize a right against selfincrimination in the way that the United States does.218
A Section 178A warrant is issued for phones discovered or
seized from a crime scene, and where the owner’s identity is
unknown.219 The warrant authorizes law enforcement to use
whatever means reasonably necessary to access the data.220 Case
law on this second type of warrant is scant, but the concerns raised
in case law about Section 154 warrants are just as present under
this circumstance. The Supreme Court of Queensland recognized
the qualitative value of iPhone evidence and advised law
enforcement to exercise caution in gathering that data.221 It was
concerned with overly intrusive and pervasive government power
and permitted lawful hacking provided that the law enforcement
agency follows all procedures, so that lawful hacking does not
raise any privacy concerns.222
In interpreting the PPRA, Queensland courts have cited to
US Fourth Amendment caselaw. In R v N,223 the Supreme Court
of Queensland discussed the privacy concerns articulated in Riley
v. California.224 In relevant part, the Queensland Court advised
exercising caution around mobile phones, saying “because of
their large storage capacity and broader privacy implications,
iPhones differ both quantitatively and qualitatively from other
documentary records.”225 Given that the Queensland court looks
to the United States for guidance on finding the balance between
law enforcement interests and privacy rights, this indicates that
the Australia court could come out the same way as the United
States on whether lawful hacking unreasonably infringes any
privacy rights. Even though the Australian federal government
does not have a federal law that protects its citizens’ privacy from
government surveillance, at least some citizens can seek recourse
in states that passed legislation to fill the gap. Thus, Queensland
218. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 580 (“Caselaw indicates that the government
violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when it compels
the defendant to tell his numerical or alphanumerical passcode.”).
219. See Raj & Marshall, supra note 215.
220. Id. at 119.
221. R v N [2015] QSC 91 para. 61.
222. Id. paras. 67-69.
223. R v N [2015] QSC 91.
224. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
225. R v N [2015] QSC 91, para. 61.
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provides some insight into how other Australian jurisdictions may
address lawful hacking and expectations of privacy.
C. Germany
Germany stands apart from the other countries discussed in
this Note because of both its strict stance against backdoors and
its more protective view of information privacy rights.226 Germany
is not representative of the European Union, nor is it the only
European nation with a stake in the Debate.227 As a leading
member of the European Union, Germany was instrumental in
the enactment of the GDPR, which provides broad data and
privacy protections.228 This follows from it holding itself out as a
leader in encryption.229 Germany endorses wide encryption use
and encourages the development of encryption technology,
despite the impediment to a law enforcement agency’s ability to
gain access to data.230 The Snowden disclosures reinforced
domestic views that the government had a responsibility to
promote and protect infrastructures that secured the data of
German citizens and companies.231 As recently as 2017, German
officials identified five guiding principles for its policy on
encryption:
1. There will be no ban or limitation on encryption products.
2. Encryption products shall be tested for their security in
order to increase the user’s trust in those products.
3. The development of encryption products by German
manufacturers is essential for the country’s security and for

226. See generally Sven Herpig & Stefan Heumann, The Encryption Debate in Germany,
CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
FOR
INT’L
PEACE
(May
30,
2019),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/30/encryption-debate-in-germany-pub79215 [https://perma.cc/3KGL-MPAF].
227. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 170 (discussing the Debate in France).
228. See Natasha Singer, The Next Privacy Battle in Europe is Over This New Law, N.Y.
TIMES (May 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/technology/europeeprivacy-regulation-battle.html [https://perma.cc/9TDB-SAL9]; Shackelford, supra
note 10, at 905-06.
229. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 186; see also Bhairav Acharya et al., Deciphering
the European Encryption Debate: Germany, OPEN TECH. INST. 2 (Jan. 2018); see Herpig &
Heumann, supra note 226, at 2.
230. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 186 (outlining the principles); see also Herpig
& Heumann, supra note 226.
231. Herpig & Heumann, supra note 226, at 2.
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those companies’ ability to compete internationally, and shall
therefore be strengthened.
4. Law enforcement and security agencies shall not be
weakened by the widespread use of encryption. The
development of additional technical competencies for those
agencies shall be fostered.
5. International cooperation on encryption issues such as
open standards and interoperability is vital and shall be
fostered bi- and multilaterally.232

These principles suggest that though the country recognizes
the need of law enforcement agencies to access that data, it will
not compromise its position on encryption. Thus, discussing
Germany’s approach to the debate is crucial in understanding the
spectrum of options from which the United States can adopt.
1. Lawful Hacking in Germany
Germany explicitly bans extraordinary access and will not
compel technology companies to modify their code.233 The
country embraces encryption and permits lawful hacking
methods instead.234 There are two legal bases for law enforcement
to utilize. Germany’s Code of Criminal Procedure (“StPO”)
contains several relevant provisions: Section 100a permits law
enforcement to hack devices because it facilitates the interception
of communications, and Sections 94 and 98 permit hacking into
lawfully seized information systems, such as smartphones.235 The
second basis is the Criminal Police Office Act (“BKAG”): Section
20k permits law enforcement officers to covertly access
information systems and to collect data that is important to a
case.236 Law enforcement officers must secure a warrant from a
court prior to engaging in hacking, and such warrants can only
be issued for serious crimes, for example, when there is an
impending danger to a person’s life or for national security
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 186.
See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT POLICY DEP’T FOR CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HACKING BY LAW ENFORCEMENT:
IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, AND COMPARISON OF PRACTICES 80 (2017); Acharya et al.,
supra note 229, at 3.
236. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 235.
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purposes.237 Law enforcement officers can bypass the warrant
requirement if there is imminent danger of harm.238 Last, law
enforcement officers are prohibited from collecting information
on “core areas” and are required to delete the information if
accidentally collected.239
2. The Fundamental Right to Privacy
Germany’s viewpoint on the Encryption Debate is largely
informed by its robust protection of the fundamental right to
information privacy.240 One scholar speculates that Germany’s
recent history and experience as a formerly oppressive regime
that engaged in massive surveillance makes the current
government hesitant to implement any laws that might
counteract its progress.241 In contrast, others, including a former
justice of the Federal Constitution Court (Germany’s highest
court), argue that the protection of fundamental rights from
pervasive government intrusion predates the modern state of
Germany and has always been an intrinsic part of its ethos.242 In
either case, Germany, more than the other countries discussed in
this Note, places a high value on the right to privacy.
The Federal Constitution Court held on two separate
occasions that overbroad lawful hacking provisions threaten the
general right of personality, “which includes the fundamental
right to the guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of
information technology systems.”243 In a 2008 ruling, the court
struck down a provision that would have compelled technology
237. See id.
238. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 189.
239. Acharya et al., supra note 229, at 3-4. Core areas are those that are highly
private areas for the individual and includes communications between close family
members and with lawyers, doctors, and the clergy. Id. at 4.
240. See id. at 2.
241. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 192; see also Herpig & Heumann, supra note
226, at 3 (“Because of unique historical experiences with surveillance during Nazi rule
and the East German Communist regime, the German intelligence community does not
enjoy the positive public image that those in the United States and the United Kingdom
do, and thus usually adopts a very low profile in public debates.”).
242. See Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere But
Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 291 (2012); Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, The Principle
of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 34 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 12, 12 (2014).
243. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 188.
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companies to code backdoors in its devices because it would go
against the government’s responsibility to ensure the safety and
integrity of its information technology systems.244 In 2016, the
Federal Constitutional Court struck down another provision
finding that the present mechanisms for lawful hacking were
“overly broad, lacked sufficiently independent oversight, and did
not provide sufficient protections for the core area of private
life.”245 The cases found that the right to privacy was a key factor
in determining the outer boundaries of lawful hacking.246
Further, in identifying that privacy was a fundamental right, the
court applied the Principle of Proportionality to strike down the
problematic provisions.247
The Principle of Proportionality demands that law
enforcement powers that severely interfere with privacy must be
sufficiently limited to the protection of weighty law enforcement
interests.248 The Principle of Proportionality is similar to the
proportionality test applied in the United Kingdom and the
balancing tests applied in Australia.249 In applying the Principle,
the Court considers three factors in its proportionality test: first,
whether the act under scrutiny appropriately promotes its stated
objective; second, whether it is necessary to promote that
objective; and third, whether the act is adequate or proportionate
in response to the need it addresses.250
Applying the three-factor proportionality test, German
courts are likely to find that without any procedural safeguards to
place a check on law enforcement agencies, lawful hacking of
encrypted iPhones severely interferes with privacy rights. First, the
244. See Herpig & Heumann, supra note 226, at 6.
245. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 189.
246. IT Federal Police Covert Surveillance Ruling, Bundes-Verfassungs-Gericht,
1BvR 966/09 ¶ 92 (Apr. 20, 2016); NRW State Police Surveillance, Bundes-VerfasungsGericht 1 BvR 370/07 ¶ 196-198 (Feb. 27, 2008).
247. IT Federal Police Covert Surveillance Ruling, Bundes-Verfassungs-Gericht,
1BvR 966/09 ¶ 124 (Apr. 20, 2016) (emphasizing that the principle of proportionality
places strict limitations on intrusions of privacy); NRW State Police Surveillance, BundesVerfasungs-Gericht 1 BvR 370/07 ¶ 167 (Feb. 27, 2008).
248. IT Federal Police Covert Surveillance Ruling, Bundes-Verfassungs-Gericht,
1BvR 966/09 HN 1b (Apr. 20, 2016).
249. Id.; see supra note 213 (discussing the balancing between privacy and
enforcement); see also supra note 178 (discussing the principle of proportionality for
determining law enforcement access to personal data).
250. Lübbe-Wolff, supra note 242, at 13.
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legal bases are appropriate in promoting its objective but risks
being overbroad if the law enforcement official does not take care
to sufficiently limit its use of that power when collecting data. The
relevant acts permit a law enforcement agency to collect data but
do not detail how that law enforcement agency would then
process that data.251 Moreover, in the two above mentioned cases
brought before the Federal Constitutional Court, the Court was
concerned with lack of independent oversight.252 Use of either
the StPO or the BKAG as the legal basis for hacking into an
encrypted iPhone risk failing the first factor in the Principle of
Proportionality. These acts fail because they do not provide
sufficient details on whether there is independent oversight of the
data collection and processing. The Federal Constitution Court
might be more receptive to lawful hacking if the data collection
were pursuant to the same oversight to which British law
enforcement are subject in the DPA. Second, whether it is
necessary to hack into encrypted devices depends on the
circumstances of the crime at issue. The Federal Constitutional
Court has indicated that the interests to protect the “life, limb,
and freedom of the individual,”253 the continued existence of the
German state, and the continued existence of the human species
are legitimate reasons.254 Within this designation, many law
enforcement interests are legitimate, given that a law
enforcement agency’s duty is the protection of its citizens. Third,
whether the act in question is adequate or proportionate in
response to the need also turns on the circumstances of crime.
The Federal Constitutional Court might find use of the StPO or
the BKAG justified for national security reasons but less so when
the acts are applied to crimes of lesser degree, such as the murder
of a local individual.
Though the two cases above concerned law enforcement
officers addressing only national security interests, it is likely the
Federal Constitutional Court will continue to apply this reasoning

251. See
What
Constitutes
Data
Processing?,
EUR.
COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/what-constitutesdata-processing_en [https://perma.cc/Y3XL-X7VN] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
252. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 189.
253. NRW State Police Surveillance, Bundes-Verfasungs-Gericht 1 BvR 370/07 HN
2 (Feb. 27, 2008).
254. Id.
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in the future to any lawful hacking case alleging a fundamental
privacy violation. Unlike the United Kingdom and Australia,
German citizens retain high expectations of privacy for the data
on their phones, and have consistently indicated that expectation
when propounding pro-encryption polices. Thus, even within the
boundaries created so far by the German legislature and judiciary,
lawful hacking may not one day be a tool available to law
enforcement. Like the United States, Germany considers privacy
rights against government surveillance a fundamental right
enshrined in its foundational laws.255 Though there are two ways
for law enforcement to lawfully hack and intercept
communications at present, the decisions of the Federal
Constitution Court suggest that it is hesitant to extend these
powers when lawfully hacking encrypted smartphones reveals
more information than to which a law enforcement agency is
privy. Unlike the other jurisdictions discussed in this Note,
Germany chooses privacy over national security interests.
D. China
The final jurisdiction this Note discusses is China, whose role
in the Encryption Debate stands apart from the others because of
the country’s distinctive motivations for its use of encryption
technology. The Snowden disclosures prompted its leadership to
reduce the country’s dependency on foreign companies.256 China
was concerned that the United States would continue to
manipulate US-based technologies to surveil those within Chinese
borders.257 Hence, China’s government seeks to limit the use of
surveillance technology by foreign countries within its borders,
which stands in contrast to its own stance on using surveillance
technology on its citizens,258 prompting some to characterize
China as a surveillance state.259 Many Chinese citizens are

255. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 189.
256. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 1; Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 117.
257. Adam Segal, China, Encryption Policy, and International Influence, HOOVER INST.
1
(2016),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/segal_webreadypdf_update
dfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHT2-VDD4].
258. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 2.
259. Jim Baker, Rethinking Encryption, LAWFARE (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/rethinking-encryption [https://perma.cc/D98G-ZQFX].
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increasingly demanding their information privacy rights,260 a
demand that has intensified as their government implements new
technologies that collect private information for monitoring
purposes.261 China’s actions thus far suggest two conclusions with
regard to the Encryption Debate. First, that it can and has
compelled technology companies to be compliant with laws
requiring technical assistance to encrypted devices. Second, that
lawful hacking does not implicate any existing privacy rights.
1. China’s Development of Encryption Technologies
In direct response to the Snowden disclosures, the Chinese
government reinitiated efforts to strengthen its cybersecurity
infrastructure to withstand spying and attacks from foreign
governments,262 though its interest in encrypted information
predates the disclosures.263 China has invested heavily in
developing secure encryption technologies, and tasked several
government agencies to research, test, and promulgate standards
for encryption related issues.264 These efforts are aimed at
developing domestic encryption technology while reducing the
use and influence of foreign encryption technology,265 resulting
in several laws that impose strict obligations on foreign companies
seeking to do business in China.
China, as early as 2003, required that all wireless devices sold
in the country comply with the WLAN Authentication and Privacy
Infrastructure (“WAPI”) standard, claiming it to be more secure
that others at the time.266 Despite heavy pushback from US-based
technology companies, eventually some complied, with Apple
introducing iPhone models that met the WAPI standard.267 The
FBI speculated that these early models essentially came with

260. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 7.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1.
263. See Segal, supra note 257, at 2.
264. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 3.
265. Id. at 4.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 5 (“Despite these setbacks, Apple and Dell both eventually introduced
phone models that support Wifi and WAPI, a sign of the Chinese government’s successful
ability to leverage market access to shape the behavior of foreign companies”). China
later discarded the mandate after facing substantial foreign pressure. Id. at 8.
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backdoors for the Chinese government.268 China regularly
updated its laws to keep up with the change in technology, with
each law reaffirming the obligation to comply with domestic
encryption polices. The 2015 Counterterrorism Law,269 for
example, imposes on telecommunication operators a
requirement to provide technical support and decryption services
to Chinese authorities for public security and intelligence
gathering purposes.270 A previous version of the law included
language that effectively imposed a backdoor requirement on all
technology companies.271 China, however, removed that language
after severe criticism from the international community,
including from the United States.272
The 2017 Cybersecurity Law273 further requires technology
companies to keep a record of users’ online activities for at least
six months.274 Section 41, in particular, emphasizes that network
operators, which is broadly defined to include Apple, must
provide technical support and assistance during law enforcement
investigations.275 Chinese press have interpreted these provisions
as comparable to the United Kingdom’s IPA and Australia’s
AAB.276 To comply with the Cybersecurity Law, Apple migrated its
iCloud data to a local Chinese cloud service277 and transferred the
encryption keys for the cloud data to Chinese authorities.278
Important to note, this was data to which Apple was already
privy,279 unlike data that can be recovered from end-to-end
encrypted communications or from iPhones secured with device
encryption. Thus, Apple’s compliance here does not undermine
268. See Segal supra note 257, at 3.
269. See generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Kongbu Zhuyi Fa
[Counterterrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong. Dec. 27, 2015, effective Jan. 1, 2016) (China).
270. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 209; Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 8; Segal,
supra note 257, at 5.
271. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 209.
272. See id.
273. See generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa
[Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017) (China).
274. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 8.
275. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 210.
276. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 2.
277. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 8; Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 119 n.97.
278. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 7; see also Manpearl, supra note 20, at 214.
279. See Apple US Guidelines, supra note 71; Apple Int’l Guidelines, supra note 71.
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its argument that it does not have a decryption key to otherwise
encrypted data. Interestingly, China banned several end-to-end
encrypted communication services, with the sole exception being
Apple’s iMessage.280 Apple has also acquiesced to demands for
app removal from the App Store, including an app that
purportedly helped Hong Kong protestors target police officers
and other privacy-protecting VPN apps.281
On October 26, 2019, China passed the newest iteration of
its encryption regulatory regime, the Encryption Law.282 The law
classifies encryption uses into three categories—core encryption,
ordinary encryption, and commercial encryption—and
articulates that while core encryption and ordinary encryption are
used for guarding safe secrets, commercial encryption is not.283
The law does not provide a definition of what constitutes
commercial encryption (leaving open the question whether
consumer devices like iPhones fall into that category) though it is
thought to alleviate some of the burdens imposed by previous
laws.284
In any case, in spite of the ambiguities in China’s laws on
encryption, Apple’s compliance thus far with Chinese laws and
regulations suggests that it will not resist future efforts to regulate
encryption measures, including the requirement to provide a
backdoor into encrypted smartphones. Though this seems odd
given that in other jurisdictions Apple has resisted such efforts, its
yielding to Chinese demands is more reasonable when dealing
with a market saturated with competitors capable of providing
encryption capabilities on their devices.285 Yet, even Chinese
technology companies have resisted against China’s requests. A
Chinese ride-sharing company, for example, refused a law
280. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 8.
281. See Burgess, supra note 157.
282. People’s Republic of China Encryption Law (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Oct. 26, 2019, effective Jan. 1, 2020).
283. See Yan Luo et al., China Enacts Encryption Law, COVINGTON (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2019/10/china_enacts_encryption_law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J4TS-WL5M]; Samm Sacks, Data Security and US China Tech
Entanglement, LAWFARE (Apr. 2, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/datasecurity-and-us-china-tech-entanglement [https://perma.cc/ETW2-BLB9] (Sacks refers
to the Encryption Law as the Cryptography Law. Both titles are correct.).
284. See Luo et al., supra note 283; Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 9.
285. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 213.
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enforcement request for data to be used in investigating the
murder of passengers.286 Huawei, the dominant smartphone
manufacturer in China,287 indicated it had reservations about a
backdoor requirement when it expressed its support for Apple in
the 2015 legal fight with the FBI.288 Chinese internet giants,
Alibaba and Tencent, pushed back against government requests
for data, explaining that such interference harms their expansion
into the global market.289 Unlike its battles in other jurisdictions,
Apple has the benefit of being backed by foreign nations and
other dominant technology companies when pressured to comply
with harsh Chinese laws.
2. China as a Surveillance State
In addition to developing domestic encryption technologies
in response to perceived threats from foreign nations and
companies, China’s investment in domestic products arises from
otherwise lacking data protection for its citizens.290 A significant
number of Chinese citizens are victims of data leaks, with their
data contributing to a thriving black market.291 China does not
have a single privacy and data protection law, and like the UK,
develops its privacy protections piecemeal.292 In response to lack
of data protection laws, the country in 2018 published the
Personal Information Security Specification, a nonbinding
standard that is meant to induce technology companies into
providing stronger encryption measures on their smartphones.293
The Cybersecurity Law, likewise, was passed in response to the
threat from third parties seeking unauthorized access to
286. Sacks, supra note 283.
287. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 214.
288. See Segal, supra note 257, at 9; Caroline Hyde, China’s Huawei Backs Apple Stance
(Feb.
21,
2016),
in
Phone
Unlocking
Dispute,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-22/china-s-huawei-backs-applestance-in-phone-unlocking-dispute [https://perma.cc/AW8Q-KAG9].
289. Samm Sacks, China’s Cybersecurity Law Takes Effect: What to Expect, LAWFARE
(June 1, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-takes-effect-whatexpect [https://perma.cc/L5WU-VVKN] [hereinafter Sacks, Cybersecurity].
290. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 99, at 7.
291. See id.
292. See Samuel Yang, China: Privacy, GLOB. DATA REV. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://globaldatareview.com/insight/handbook/2021/article/china-privacy
[https://perma.cc/JNT6-N7R2].
293. See Laskai & Segal, supra note 20, at 7.
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consumer data.294 Since its passage, the Cybersecurity Law serves
as the government’s main piece of legislation for data protection
and control.295
Though these laws suggest China respects the privacy of its
citizens, that respect does not extend to privacy from government
surveillance.296 The provisions imposing strict obligations on
technology companies to assist with law enforcement
investigations and efforts apply to all companies operating within
Chinese borders, not just foreign ones. More, its development of
a social credit system undermines any claims that it seeks to secure
the privacy and confidential information of its citizens.297
Many consumers worldwide have experienced a variation of
the social credit system: a credit score based on debt repayment,
the ratings given by Uber and similar ridesharing companies, and
even likes and comments received on an Instagram post.298 The
system bears an eerie resemblance to the Black Mirror299 episode
where individuals rank every social interaction with each other
and rankings directly contribute to a person’s standing in
society.300 The idea of quantifying a person’s action to either
reward or penalize them is not a new one, and here, once the
system is fully implemented, the idea will be applied on a much
larger and more formal scale.301 At present, only some local
governments have pilot programs in place, with each program

294. See Yang, supra note 292.
295. See Sacks, supra note 283.
296. See Segal, supra note 257, at 10.
297. Nicole Kobie, The complicated truth about China’s social credit system, WIRED MAG.
(June 7, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-social-credit-system-explained
[https://perma.cc/X9RV-T7A6].
298. Id.
299. Black Mirror is a science fiction anthology show in which the issue of each
standalone episode revolves around a piece of technology and its effects on the
https://www.netflix.com/title/70264888
characters'
lives.
See
NETFLIX
[https://perma.cc/6LXV-FKD7] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
300. Black Mirror: Nosedive, NETFLIX (Oct. 21, 2016); Sophie Gilbert, Black Mirror’s
(Oct.
21,
2016),
‘Nosedive’
Skewers
Social
Media,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/10/black-mirror-nosedivereview-season-three-netflix/504668/ [https://perma.cc/TVJ3-YMK9].
301. See Kobie, supra note 297 (“The idea itself is not a Chinese phenomenon . . .
But if the Chinese system does come together as envisioned, it would still be something
very unique. It’s both unique and part of a global trend.”).
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varying from the next.302 One city, for example, starts all residents
at 1,000 points and makes deductions for bad behavior and
additions for good behavior.303 Tracking everyday behavior is
made easier with the widespread use of facial recognition
technology and data sharing between companies.304 China
justifies the use of such a system to build trust, enforce laws, and
hold bad actors accountable.305 It frames the system as way to
further protect its citizens from those who would maliciously use
personal information and provides individuals with an alternative
means of building financial credit.306 If anything, the social credit
system falls within the purview of China’s goal to increase data
protection for its citizens by using new technologies in its
governance scheme.307
Between laws requiring technology companies to provide
technical assistance and the increased use of surveillance schemes
such as the social credit system, Chinese citizens do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy for the data on their
smartphones. Law enforcement agencies can access digital
communications given that encryption is virtually not allowed on
most services in the country, and the robust development of
encryption technology largely overcomes potential barriers in
hacking the phone. Not only does China endorse lawful hacking,
it actively strives to ensure access to that data. Thus, though it has
concerns when other unauthorized persons gain access to its
citizens’ data, China itself holds carte blanche to all
communications and data.

302. Id.; Louise Matsakis, How the West Got China’s Social Credit Wrong, WIRED MAG.
(July 29, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/china-social-credit-score-system/
[https://perma.cc/9QGV-XSK9].
303. See Kobie, supra note 297; Matsakis, supra note 302.
304. See Kobie, supra note 297; Matsakis, supra note 302. Those with a deficit of
social credit face restrictions on their choices and movements. Likewise, those with a
positive rating gain access to discounts, benefits, and other rewards from the
government. Id.
305. See Kobie, supra note 297; Matsakis, supra note 302.
306. See Kobie, supra note 297; Matsakis, supra note 302.
307. Eunsun Cho, The Social Credit System: Not Just Another Chinese Idiosyncrasy, J. PUB.
& INT’L AFFAIRS, https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/social-credit-system-not-just-anotherchinese-idiosyncrasy [https://perma.cc/GY9N-ZR3Y] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
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IV. UNITED STATES
The Encryption Debate in the United States is arguably the
most notable of all the countries discussed in this Note, primarily
because of the divisive split in public opinion when the US
government first requested a court order to compel Apple to
assist FBI agents in accessing the data on a suspected terrorist’s
phone.308 The debate at the time largely focused on the first issue,
whether the US government could use the All Writs Act
(“AWA”)309 to compel a technology company like Apple to build
a backdoor into its smartphone. Within two weeks of each other,
two separate federal courts issued contradictory orders on the
limits of the AWA as applied to the circumstances of this
Debate.310 US courts throughout the country have entertained
several similar suits, yet none have made it to the Supreme
Court.311 In addition to the concerns raised by the first issue, some
commentators have speculated about whether the Fourth
Amendment limits the government from hacking into an
encrypted smartphone.312 Unlike the first issue, the Supreme
308. See Krisnadev Calamur, Public Opinion Supports Apple Over the FBI—or Does It?,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
24,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/02/apple-fbi-polls/470736/
[https://perma.cc/BD42-U2W2]; Dustin Volz & Abhirup Roy, U.S. government, Apple take
encryption case to court of public opinion, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-commission/u-s-governmentapple-take-encryption-case-to-court-of-public-opinion-idUSKCN0VV185
[https://perma.cc/68NB-4SHE]; Tracey Lien, Whether Apple or FBI is winning the PR war
depends on which poll you’re looking at, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2016),
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-apple-fbi-polls-20160224story.html. The case drew considerable attention from technology moguls and advocates.
See
Amicus
Briefs
in
Support
of
Apple,
APPLE
(Mar.
2,
2016),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2016/03/03Amicus-Briefs-in-Support-of-Apple/
[https://perma.cc/3VGT-8P8A]; Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 569.
309. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(2018).
310. See infra Section IV.A.
311. See, e.g., In re: Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in The Execution of a
Search Warrant Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)
[hereinafter Brooklyn action]. At the time of the Brooklyn action, there were at least nine
separate requests made under the AWA to order Apple to help the government with
bypassing the encryption measures—Apple objected to each request. Id. at 349.
312. See Grady Lowman, Apple vs. FBI: The Forgotten Fourth Amendment Argument,
RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (Mar. 21, 2016), https://rutgerspolicyjournal.org/apple-vsfbi-forgotten-fourth-amendment-argument [https://perma.cc/RM6Q-4UUN]; Maxel
Moreland, Apple Inc. and the FBI: Balancing Fourth Amendment Privacy Concerns against
Societal Safety Concerns in the Digital Age, U. CIN. L. REV. (June 17, 2016),
https://uclawreview.org/2016/06/17/apple-inc-and-the-fbi-balancing-4th-amendment-
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Court has discussed, as recently as 2018, the Fourth Amendment’s
relationship with data from smartphones.313 Regarding the
second issue, whether lawful hacking violates reasonable
expectations of privacy, recent Fourth Amendment decisions
about cell phones suggest that cell phone data must be given
heightened protection.314 This Part will proceed by first, offering
a discussion on the AWA by analyzing the first issue, and then
second, by discussing the Fourth Amendment and analyzing the
second issue.
A. Using the All Writs Act to Compel Apple to Create a Backdoor for the
US Government
The All Writs Act states that “[t]he Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”315 The act serves as
a gap-filler for a federal court to use when no other law might
provide it authority to make a judgment or an order.316 As a
threshold matter, federal courts are only given discretionary
authority to issue orders when three elements are met:
(1) issuance of the writ must be ‘in aid of’ the issuing court’s
jurisdiction;
(2) the type of writ requested must be necessary or
appropriate to provide such aid to the issuing court’s
jurisdiction; and
(3) the issuance of the writ must be agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.317

However, the All Writs Act is infrequently used, and there is
little judicial guidance on whether it could be used to compel
Apple to modify its code to provide a backdoor into its devices.318

privacy-concerns-against-societal-safety-concerns-in-the-digital-age/
[https://perma.cc/CE96-SDFM]. But see Kerr, Preliminary thoughts, supra note 68;
Traylor, supra note 27, at 510.
313. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
314. See id. at 2218.
315. All Writs Act, 28 USC § 1651 (2018).
316. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 353.
317. Id. at 350.
318. See id. at 349.
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The most recent Supreme Court decision involving AWA,
United States v. New York Telephone Co.,319 offers some guidance for
how to interpret the act. It was a different time with different
technologies, yet the Supreme Court dealt with the same tension
of whether the AWA could be used to compel a company to
provide technical assistance to the FBI in the pursuit of shutting
down criminal activities.320 In New York Telephone, the FBI sought
the company’s help with installing pen registers321 on phone lines
belonging to individuals suspected of running a gambling ring.322
The company, pursuant to a judicial order, had already provided
some help, including identifying the telephone lines associated
with the suspected phone numbers, but declined when asked to
lease to the FBI unused telephone lines that ran near the
suspected telephone line.323 In finding for the FBI, the Supreme
Court identified three additional factors to consider when
interpreting the AWA:
(1) the closeness of the relationship between the person or
entity to whom the proposed writ is directed and the matter
over which the court has jurisdiction;
(2) the reasonableness of the burden to be imposed on the
writ’s subject; and
(3) the necessity of the requested writ to aid the court’s
jurisdiction.324

So here, it was New York Telephone’s facilities that were
being used, the burden to lease the lines to install pen registers
was very low (especially because the company itself used them for
its own purposes), and it was only the company that impeded the
FBI from identifying those involved in the gambling enterprise.
This decision guides current understanding on the proper
application of the AWA.

319. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
320. See id. at 161.
321. Pen registers are devices that record the numbers dialed from a wired
telephone. See Pen Register, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
322. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162.
323. See id. Installing a pen register on the nearby lines allowed for the FBI to
monitor the incoming and outgoing calls of the suspect phone lines.
324. See id. at 174-78; Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d. at 351.
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1. Current Jurisprudence on Applying the AWA to iPhones
There is no existing explicit law that the US government can
use to require a technology company to build a backdoor into its
encrypted devices. When the issue was brought to court, the
government depended on the AWA as its primary argument. Two
different federal courts issued contemporaneous orders on
whether the federal government can compel Apple to modify its
encryption code to allow for extraordinary access to iPhones.325
In both cases, the US government argued that the AWA must be
interpreted to permit the government to compel Apple to assist
its efforts in gathering the data from the phone.326 In both cases,
Apple argued that the AWA must be read to leave the decision to
compel to the legislature.327 Ultimately, the US government
withdrew both suits, rendering the debate in the courts moot.
Despite the pause in the courts, it is worth exploring these
opinions to understand how the Encryption Debate could be
resolved in the US given that the tension between the two entities
remains.328
After Apple denied additional help for unlocking the iPhone
recovered from the San Bernardino shooting,329 the US
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) then sought the assistance of a
federal court to compel the company to provide the technical
assistance required.330 Using the AWA as authority, the
government argued that 1) Apple was not far removed from the
underlying controversy and the related investigation because it
designed the phone and coded the software at issue;331 2) the
specific technical assistance sought would not present an
unreasonable burden on Apple because a software company is

325. See In re: An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant
on a Black Lexus IS300, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016)
[hereinafter California action]; Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d. at 344.
326. See Govt’s Ex Parte Appl. for Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search; Mem. of Points and Authorities; Decl. of Christopher Pluhar; Exhibit (ED No.
15-0415M) [hereinafter DOJ Motion].
327. See Apple Inc.’s Mot. to Vacate Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents
in Search, and Opp’n to Gov’t’s Mot. to Compel Assistance (ED No. CM 16-10 (SP))
[hereinafter Apple Motion].
328. See supra Section II.B.
329. See supra Section II.B.i.
330. See DOJ Motion supra note 326, at 1.
331. See id. at 13.
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capable of modifying its own code for a specific device;332 and 3)
Apple’s technical assistance is necessary in furtherance of the
lawful warrant to search the phone.333 Shortly after filing in
federal court, the judge issued a three-page order requiring
Apple to provide the technical assistance in the manner
requested to achieve the objectives listed.334
Apple, in response, filed a motion to vacate the DOJ’s
motion, framing the DOJ’s request to “create a back door” as one
that would “undermine the basic security and privacy interests of
hundreds of millions of individuals around the globe.”335 Apple
first argues that both Congress and the Obama Administration
considered the tension, and ultimately decided to not update
existing relevant laws to include Apple and like technology
companies within the statutory purview.336 Next, in applying the
New York Telephone discretionary factors, Apple argued 1) its
connection to the underlying controversy and the related
investigation is too attenuated because it does not own the phone
nor have access to the data;337 2) the government’s request would
impose a substantial undue burden on both Apple and the
customers who depend on their device;338 and 3) the government
did not establish that Apple’s assistance was necessary in
furtherance of the warrant.339 A hearing was scheduled for March
22, 2016 but was later cancelled when the FBI revealed it was able
to access the phone through the assistance of a third party.340

332. See id. at 14.
333. See id. at 16. The motion does not state why Apple’s assistance is necessary
other than citing an analogous case involving an encrypted laptop.
334. See California action, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543. Given that it was an order,
there is no analysis of the AWA.
335. See Apple Motion, supra note 327, at 1.
336. See id. at 8.
337. See id. at 20.
338. See id. at 23.
339. Id. at 29. Apple also put forth arguments that the order violates its First
Amendment right from writing code and its Fifth Amendment right of due process. See
generally id. While both these arguments are important, they will not be discussed in this
analysis given that this Section focuses on the use of the AWA.
340. See Kim Zetter & Brian Barrett, Apple to FBI: You Can’t Force Us to Hack the San
MAG.
(Feb.
25,
2016),
Bernardino
iPhone,
WIRED
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apple-brief-fbi-response-iphone/
[https://perma.cc/SPM8-V2HB]; Collier & Favirar, supra note 92 (reporting that the US
government enlisted third-party company, Cellebrite, to hack into the phone).
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In a different case, a federal judge in the Eastern District of
New York entertained the same arguments as above and instead
found Apple’s argument to be more compelling. In In re: Order
Requiring Apple, Inc. To Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by this Court, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”)
seized, pursuant to a warrant, an iPhone 5s running iOS7 that
belonged to an individual suspected of drug trafficking.341 As with
the iPhone in California, government investigative efforts were
impeded by the iPhone’s passcode security.342 The government
then turned to the court to compel Apple to provide technical
assistance in unlocking the phone, relying on the AWA and the
cases interpreting it.343 Finding for Apple, Judge Orenstein
opined that the government failed to establish the threshold
requirement that its request was agreeable to the usages and
principles of law because the legislative scheme regarding the
relationship between government surveillance and third-party
technology and communications suggested otherwise.344 First, the
limitation provisions in the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (“CALEA”)345 apply to Apple because it
qualifies under the “information services” exemption.346 Second,
issuing in favor of the government would violate the separation of
powers doctrine because Congress had considered this issue and
chose not to enact a law addressing it.347 For Orenstein, the AWA
analysis ends at the threshold level, but he opines on the New York
Telephone discretionary factors to explain that the AWA analysis
would still achieve the same result.348 In sum, Apple was not
sufficiently close in relationship with either the criminal activity

341. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). Though not
relevant for the purposes of the analysis, this iPhone runs an older version of iOS that
has markedly less encryption measures than the iPhone from San Bernardino.
342. See id. at 346.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 354.
345. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
(2018).
346. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 355. Interestingly, Judge Orenstein
accepted the distinction between data-in-motion and data-at-rest. See supra Section II.A.
But he did not think this distinction changed his opinion that CALEA, which uses
language referring to data-in-motion, applies to data-at-rest. Id.
347. See id. at 363. For a brief discussion on pending legislative actions, see Section
V.A.
348. See id. at 364.
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or the investigation,349 compelling Apple to provide technical
assistance that would erode the iPhone’s encryption measures
would be unduly burdensome,350 and the availability of third
parties who can provide assistance into accessing the iPhone
weakens the government’s argument that Apple must be the one
to provide technical assistance.351 The opinion ends by reiterating
that the debate is a decision best left to be resolved by Congress.352
2. The All Writs Act Cannot be Interpreted to Compel Apple to
Write Code that Creates a Backdoor for the Government.
Setting aside the threshold issue of whether CALEA applies
and precludes this inquiry, Apple presents the stronger argument
against the adoption of backdoors. The first factor, looking at the
closeness of the relationship between the directed entity and the
underlying controversy, favors Apple. Arguably, since it originally
made the argument in 2015, Apple has provided more complex
encryption measures that are less susceptible to hacking.353 These
increased measures suggest that although before Apple may not
have had as close a relationship with any of the underlying crimes
(indeed it did not with either the shooting or the drug
trafficking), its actions have since reluctantly provided protection
to those perpetrators who rely on the encryption to continue their
crimes. Encrypted iPhones can now safely serve as the phone of
choice for those who need that privacy measure in evading lawful
governmental action. Terrorist cells can exploit the availability of
encryption measures as ISIS did when it instructed its followers to
use encryption measures to dodge law enforcement officials.354
Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance testified to Congress
about a sex-trafficking investigation impeded by encryption,
where the incarcerated suspect in a recorded phone call said,
“Apple and Google came out with these softwares that can no
longer be [un]encrypted by the police . . . [i]f our phone[s are]
349. See id.
350. See id. at 368.
351. See id. at 373.
352. See id. at 376.
353. The latest version of the software, iOS 14, now requires applications
downloaded from the App Store to abide by Apple’s privacy and security standards. See
User Privacy and Data Use, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/app-store/user-privacyand-data-use/ [https://perma.cc/CZ5V-W8EQ] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
354. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 571.
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running on iOS8 software, they can’t open my phone. That may
be [a] gift from God.”355 Last, as articulated earlier in this Note,
there is an increasing concern that encryption creates a safe
haven for pedophiles and others who seek to sexually exploit
minors.356 Still, these examples only serve to illustrate that while
encryption may be another tool for individuals to exploit, it is
simply that—a tool. The use of an iPhone in a criminal
undertaking does not automatically implicate Apple, especially
because there exist legitimate uses for the device and the
encryption measures ensure the security of the information on
the phone for the average user, not just criminal users. For
comparison, if the iPhone were a gun, the blame for a shooting
shifts to the person who pulled the trigger, not the gun
manufacturer.357
The second factor, regarding the reasonableness of the
burden on Apple, also is in its favor. In the California case, Apple
explained the time and costs it would take to build the type of
software the government seeks.358 Critics are justifiably skeptical
of this reasoning, given that Apple’s market value was well over
US$2 trillion in August 2020, and its products continue to see
incredible success globally as society increasingly relies on
technology for everyday life.359 Apple also posited that given its
role in consumer data protection, creating a system that could be

355. See Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (written testimony of Cyrus Vance, Jr., NY Cnty. Dist. Att’y),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Vance%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5CNB-GH5Q].
356. See supra Section II.B.iii.
357. Recognizing the harm that could be imposed on firearms manufacturers,
Congress effectively immunized them with the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act (“PLCAA”). See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903;
see also Melissa Chan, Just About Everyone but the Gun Maker Gets Sued After a Mass Shooting,
(Aug.
20,
2019),
https://time.com/5653066/mass-shooting-lawsuits/
TIME
[https://perma.cc/LK7B-WJBU].
358. See Apple motion, supra note 335, at 23.
359. See Amrith Ramkumar, Apple Hits $2 Trillion Market Value as App Store Battles
Continue, WALL ST. J. (Aug, 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-surges-to-2trillion-market-value-11597848808 [https://perma.cc/9RJG-PXQV]; Jack Nicas, Apple
Reaches $2 Trillion, Punctuating Big Tech’s Grip, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/technology/apple-2-trillion.html
[https://perma.cc/XBL3-PZPD]. Almost certainly the COVID-19 pandemic benefited
Apple as the shift to working from home may have led to an increased demand for the
requisite technology.
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vulnerable to outside attacks would “substantially tarnish the
Apple brand,”360 and would hurt the US economy overall as the
subset of consumers who desire encryption shift to foreign
manufacturers who sell encrypted devices.361 Again, it is dubious
whether that reasoning is valid because of the question of whether
consumers actually care about data protection measures on their
phone.362 More, it is unlikely that Apple’s market power would
suffer at all if the US government were to institute an
extraordinary access requirement.363 Even so, the factor is likely
to be in Apple’s favor considering that the scale of the burden is
substantially more than what the Supreme Court considered in
New York Telephone. There, the Supreme Court found the order
appropriate given that the company’s own use of pen registers for
business reasons demonstrated the minimal burden the FBI’s
request imposed upon them.364 Unlike that of the telephone
company, Apple’s response would certainly cost significantly
more in both time, expense, and reputation even if it is a
technology giant more equipped to handle such costs.
The last factor, whether Apple’s assistance is necessary to
accomplish the goal of the writ, is decidedly in its favor. As Judge
Orenstein astutely pointed out, the government ultimately
engaging with third party companies demonstrates that Apple’s
technical assistance is not necessary.365 It is true that Apple is the
only actor that can modify the encryption code on its future
phones, especially considering that its software is proprietary
code that is installed on patented devices. Only in that sense can
their assistance be necessary. But that is not the case here, because
the underlying goal of a warrant issued in a criminal investigation
is the resolution of a past crime or the prevention of a likely future
crime, and the warrant is tied to the specific circumstances of
each case.366 Speculating on future misuse of an encrypted
360. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
361. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 169-70.
362. See Rozenshtein, supra note 11, at 172.
363. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 227.
364. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977) (“The Company
concedes that it regularly employs such devices without court order for the purposes of
checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law.”).
365. See Brooklyn action, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 at 373.
366. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (“The requirement that
warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under
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smartphone is not a sufficient reason to characterize Apple’s
technical assistance as necessary. Evidently, the US federal
government is equipped to either hack into the phone on its own
or contract with a third party.367
B. The Fourth Amendment Privacy Implications of Lawful Hacking
Privacy concerns, especially privacy from government
surveillance, became relevant in the Encryption Debate when
Apple framed itself as a protector of its consumers’ privacy.368 To
reiterate, privacy concerns are very different from the
cybersecurity concerns that Apple emphasized in its motions.369
Whereas cybersecurity touches more on the security of the
infrastructure protecting the information, privacy refers more to
the conception that a person has a right to be free from outside
intrusion into the most intimate or confidential part of their
lives.370 Apple, in its public role as a protector of consumer data,
makes good on its promise of privacy through the encryption
measures on its devices.371 The United States does not have an
overall privacy law, and instead takes a sectoral approach to the
right of privacy.372 In the United States, concerns regarding
privacy from government action implicate the Fourth
Amendment, and this next Section will delve into whether any
concerns are raised when the US government lawfully hacks into
an iPhone.
1. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another. As to what is to be taken nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant.”).
367. See discussion supra Section II.B.i (explaining how the FBI hired a third party
for the San Bernardino iPhone and internal methods for the Pensacola iPhones).
368. See Cook letter, supra note 71.
369. See supra Section II.A.i (distinguishing between privacy and cybersecurity
concerns).
370. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating that the US
Constitution creates zones, or penumbras, of privacy).
371. See supra Section II.A.iii.
372. Ari E. Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 129, 144
(2018).

830 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

unreasonable searches and seizures.”373 For a search or seizure to
be reasonable, a neutral judge must first issue a warrant justified
by probable cause.374 The Fourth Amendment was the Founding
Fathers’ response to Great Britain’s arbitrary use of writs of
assistance in colonial America, and imposed a limit on the federal
government’s ability to intrude into an individual’s private
physical space.375 Though the case law has considerably changed
since its adoption, the heart of the Fourth Amendment is its
fundamental protection against overly pervasive government
intrusion and surveillance.376 In Katz v. United States,377 the
Supreme Court reframed the scope of the Fourth Amendment as
a protection that is based on a person’s notion of privacy, and
rejected earlier interpretations that focused only on tangible,
material interests.378 The Katz Court found the government’s use
of wiretapping technology to record an otherwise private phone
conversation problematic because “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.”379 Moving forward, the Court’s
Fourth Amendment analysis hinged on two-prongs: “first, that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”380
Since Katz, the Supreme Court (and the judiciary, in
general) has struggled with drawing bright-lines for which
circumstances generate an objectively reasonable expectation of

373. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
374. Id.
375. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018); Riley v. California,
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014).
376. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.
377. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
378. The majority opinion departs from the narrow view articulated in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which uses the trespass doctrine to define the scope
of the Fourth Amendment. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. The Katz Court found significant the
difference between the petitioner’s physical presence in a public phone booth and his
phone call within that space. Id. at 511.
379. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
380. Id. at 361. Even though this test is from the concurrence, it is the one that’s
used most often. The Court reiterated the “reasonable expectation of society” test in
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding a party must exhibit a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the place searched to have standing challenging a government
search). The test was, shortly thereafter, formally adopted in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979).
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privacy,381 especially in light of rapidly evolving technology that
can undermine such expectations.382 Yet, though the Court has
identified specific circumstances that “render a warrantless
search or seizure reasonable,” no government action is “beyond
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, for it must be reasonable in its
scope and manner of execution.”383 In applying Fourth
Amendment principles to its treatment of phones, two recent
Supreme Court decisions are informative and touch on the
heightened protections given to smartphones because, like many
technologies, they have become an essential part of an
individual’s life. These two cases, amongst others, offers some
guidance on how the Supreme Court might decide if the question
of lawful hacking comes before them.
In Riley v. California,384 the Court held that a warrantless
search and seizure of the digital contents of a cell phone is
unconstitutional, even when the phone is seized incident to an
arrest. During the arrest for an earlier unlawful activity, a police
officer searched David Riley and seized a smart phone from his
body.385 At that time and later again at the police station, a police
officer had gone through the phone and uncovered evidence of
Riley’s involvement with a shooting a few weeks earlier—the
investigating officers did not have a separate warrant to go
through Riley’s phone.386 Chief Justice Roberts posited two
observations that persuaded him and the rest of the Court that
smartphones must be given special treatment. First, cell phones
are ubiquitous such that an alien species may perceive it “an
important feature of human anatomy.”387 Second, there is an
understanding that “modern cell phones, as a category, implicate
privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by a cigarette pack,

381. It is relevant to note that courts do not dwell on whether the first prong is ever
met, and that the Fourth Amendment test focuses on the second prong. See Kerr, supra
note 68; Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 357, 372
(2019) [hereinafter Ohm II].
382. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
383. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 444, 447-48 (2013).
384. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
385. Id. at 379. David Riley was arrested after an earlier lawful search of his car
revealed his unlawful possession of concealed and loaded firearms. Id. at 378.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 385.
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a wallet, or a purse.”388 Even a brief search through an iPhone can
reveal a host of confidential information to which a person is
otherwise not privy. Thus, any search for digital information on a
smartphone must be done pursuant to a warrant.389
Carpenter v. United States390 likewise dealt with the amount of
data that can be garnered from a cell phone, more specifically,
holding that law enforcement would need warrants to gather
cellular service location information (“CSLI”).391 In addition to
reformulating the third-party doctrine,392 Chief Justice Roberts
stressed the role of the court to rebalance privacy interests when
faced against law enforcement equipped with powerful
surveillance tools.393 This decision, along with Justice Sonia
Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones394 and the
majority opinion in Riley,395 emphasizes the unique role that
mobile phones play in individuals’ lives and the way that
technological advances give the government more tools to
intrude into a person’s private area.396 Thus, investigations into
smartphone data must have heightened protections.

388. Id. at 393.
389. Id. at 401.
390. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018).
391. Id. at 2223.
392. Unlike Riley’s inquiry into data gathered from within the device, Carpenter
dealt with information collected from cell site towers and its implications for the thirdparty doctrine. The third-party doctrine is premised on the theory that the disclosing
party adopts an assumption of risk of the further dissemination of that information by
the third-party. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in pen records because the information was being conveyed to a
telephone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records because this was information disclosed
to banks and their employees in the ordinary course of business). Third-party doctrine
is not at issue in any encryption cases because encryption ensures that the information is
never disclosed to a third party. See Gonzalez, supra note 38, at 26.
393. The opinion states, in relevant part, “[f]irst, that the Amendment seeks to
secure the privacies of life against arbitrary power, and Second, and relatedly, that a
central aim of the Framers was to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police
surveillance.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (citations omitted).
394. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012).
395. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
396. This is not a new view in the court. In an earlier case, Justice Kennedy opined,
“[c]ell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may
consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even
self-identification.” See City of Ontario, Cal., v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010).
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2. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy after Carpenter
At present, there is no legal authority that explicitly permits
lawfully hacking into encrypted devices, nor has there been any
cases challenging its constitutionality.397 Still, it stands to reason
that after Riley and Carpenter, law enforcement may lawfully hack
into an encrypted smartphone provided they have a warrant in
hand, which is often the case. Though smartphones and
smartphone data receive heightened protection, law
enforcement could still access the data after securing a legitimate
warrant based on probable cause. While these phones relied on
encryption, a phone holder’s expectation of privacy, premised on
that reliance, is diminished once that device is lawfully seized and
a warrant to search the contents of the phone is issued. The
Fourth Amendment does not protect cell phone data per se, but it
does protect individuals against oppressive methods in acquiring
that information. The Amendment is a promise against the
arbitrary use of state power. Lawfully hacking into a phone after
securing a legitimate warrant does not implicate the privacy
concerns raised by the Fourth Amendment.
Professor Orin Kerr has consistently argued that encryption
does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.398 Encryption
makes accessing the data on the phone difficult, but that difficulty
itself does not provide a phone holder with additional Fourth
Amendment rights. Once the government has a warrant to search
the digital information in a smartphone, as required by Riley, it
may do so without running afoul of any constitutional violations
because the Fourth Amendment “does not protect the individual
if the government decides to devote its resources to [successfully]
decrypting” the device.399 Even so, the Court’s concerns in
Carpenter suggest its willingness to revisit the issue in the future if
it becomes apparent that the balance between privacy and police
power becomes unsettled.
Professor Paul Ohm notes that the Court is dealing with tech
exceptionalism, an idea that the exceptionalism of modern

397. Candace Gliksberg, Note, Decrypting the Fourth Amendment, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
765, 790 (2017); Manpearl, supra note 20, at 191.
398. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 504
(2001) [hereinafter Kerr II]; Kerr, supra note 68.
399. Kerr II, supra note 398, at 517.
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technology does not sit squarely with previous judicial opinions
and conceptions of law.400 Rather than stick with traditional
analogies, the Court in both Riley and Carpenter looked at the
reality of what cell phones produce and, in each opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts advised taking into account the sophisticated
technologies present today or potentially available in the
future,401 and echoed Justice Brandeis’s concern from a case fifty
years prior.402 The modern smartphone is the “perfect
surveillance device.”403
For now, a defendant contesting lawful hacking could argue
that the hacking was unreasonable in its scope and manner of
execution. To be reasonable in scope and manner of execution,
a judge must abide by the particularity requirement for issuing a
warrant,404 and should only permit the collection of information
if the collection achieves the stated objectives and is completed in
the least intrusive manner possible. A higher standard must apply
whenever a judge considers an application for a warrant to access
information in a smartphone, and any affidavit supplied in
support of an application for a warrant must provide a substantial
basis for probable cause.405 This could mean that those going
through the phone must take care to not complete a full scan of
the phone and instead only look through the relevant
applications in the phone, or that the warrant only permits some
types of evidence for collection. For example, those going
through a phone to find evidence of child pornography need only
to go through the photos and videos to see whether the individual
violates any child pornography laws. In United States v. Zappe,406 a
magistrate judge issued a warrant to search the defendant’s
400. Ohm II, supra note 381, at 399.
401. Id. at 409.
402. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)
(“Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of
what is whispered in the closet.”).
403. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (“perfect surveillance
device” language).
404. See generally Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
405. See, e.g., United States v. Calk, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116013 (finding that the
thirty-seven-page affidavit sufficiently alleged probable cause in a warrant application).
406. United States v. Zappe, No. 5-20-CR-00284-OLG, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191122
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2020).
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iPhone for child pornography. The defendant contested the
warrant, claiming that it was overbroad in scope. The court
rejected the defendant’s contentions and explained in detail that
the warrant was valid and not overbroad given that “there was
ample probable cause to suspect Zappe possessed child
pornography” and that iPhones are capable of storing sexually
explicit images of young children.407
Technology has advanced such that it collects every shard
and piece of an individual’s life, and when put together, paints a
mosaic of users that is more probative than any actual
utterance.408 The latest iPhones do not just store information, like
photos and communications. They also track movements and
collect other data in service of each user. The Health App, for
example, automatically counts each person’s steps. Smartphones
reveal more information than the search of a house ever could,
and even non-content information, or metadata, can be
significant in finding someone guilty of a crime. Until digital
search technology is developed so that it performs targeted
searches on phones, law enforcement agencies must be careful in
the data they recover. A judge, when assessing a warrant
application, should be aware of these considerations and assess
on a case-by-case basis whether the sought-after information
would justify the pervasive violation of privacy incurred by the
device holder.
V. LAWFUL HACKING AS THE APPROPRIATE SOLUTION TO
THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE
To law enforcement, encryption is an impediment to its
ability to investigate crimes and hold perpetrators responsible. To
users of devices, encryption is a promise of privacy and security.
To Apple, encryption is not only a business strategy but an almost
guaranteed way to avoid future litigation for failing to guard
customer data. In resolving the Encryption Debate, the United
States must carefully balance the legitimate interests of law
enforcement against the serious security and privacy implications
407. Id. at 16.
408. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (explaining the extent of the government’s ability to aggregate data via
monitoring).
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posed by accessing smartphone data. The central argument for
imposing backdoor requirements is efficiency and expediency.
Law enforcement agencies want extraordinary access because it
allows for quicker results with minimal costs. But until there is a
feasible technological solution, lawful hacking is the only viable
choice in moving forward in the Encryption Debate. Given the
ever-present tension between government surveillance and
individual security and privacy, lawful hacking forces each side to
compromise while still maintaining its overall goals. Of the two
options discussed in this Note, lawful hacking presents itself as the
more desirable solution. This Part will proceed by first discussing
current legislation proposed in the United States, and then
offering normative arguments against the adoption of backdoors,
and normative arguments for continued use of lawful hacking.
A. Current US Legislation
In the United States, as concluded by Judge Orenstein,409 it
is up to the legislature whether it wants to provide the
government with additional powers, not the judiciary. The
Supreme Court has likewise echoed this sentiment in the context
of evolving technologies. Justice Samuel Alito opined, “In
circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best
solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body
is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a
comprehensive way.”410 The existence of CALEA and the overall
legislative scheme suggests that Congress has considered this
tension before and that a law requiring a backdoor into an
encrypted device is not outside the realm of possibility.411
The US Congress is currently grappling with both issues
posed by this conundrum and is considering drafted legislation
on exactly these issues. On March 5, 2020, US Senator Lindsey
Graham introduced in the Senate the Eliminating Abusive and
Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act of 2020

409. See Brooklyn Action, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
410. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429-30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
411. If this were the case, Apple and other technology companies might then file a
case arguing a violation of their First Amendment rights. This discussion, though
relevant, is outside the scope of this Note.
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(“EARN IT Act”).412 The bill responds to the problem of
encrypted technologies perpetuating the sexual exploitation of
children413 by proposing that Section 230 of the Communications
Act (“Section 230”) be amended to impose liability on internet
service providers that provide end-to-end encryption but do not
provide law enforcement officials the means to decrypt the
material.414 Section 230 immunizes online platforms from liability
for the actions of its users, but the EARN IT Act would remove
those protections if those platforms host sexually explicit material
depicting children.415 The EARN IT Act has undergone several
revisions in the Senate and is currently accompanied by a House
of Representatives version of the bill with similar language.416
More directly on point is a subsequent bill introduced by
Senator Graham. On June 23, 2020, Senator Graham with
Senators Tom Cotton and Marsha Blackburn introduced the
Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act (“LAED”).417 LAED
addresses the frustrations expressed by law enforcement agencies
tasked with the prevention and detection of matters of national
security by effectively requiring technology companies to build in
backdoors to their devices.418 The bill proposes several
412. Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act of
2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020).
413. Keller & Dance, supra note 111. See also Susan Landau, A Thoughtful Response
to Going Dark and the Child Pornography Issue, LAWFARE (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughtful-response-going-dark-and-child-pornographyissue [https://perma.cc/RZZ6-27ML].
414. The bill has gone through several revisions in the Senate, and is accompanied
by H.R. 8454. See Riana Pfefferkorn, House Introduces EARN IT Act Companion Bill, Somehow
Manages To Make It Even Worse, CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y. (Oct. 5, 2020),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/10/house-introduces-earn-it-act-companionbill-somehow-manages-make-it-even-worse [https://perma.cc/W98R-FUEA].
415. Riana Pfefferkorn, The Senate’s twin threats to online speech and security,
BROOKINGS (July 13, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/the-senates-twinthreats-to-online-speech-and-security/ [https://perma.cc/D8WF-XNUG].
416. Id. See also Pfefferkorn, House Introduces EARN IT, supra note 414.
417. Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act, S. 4051, 116th Cong. (2020).
418. Press Release, Senate Judiciary Comm., Graham, Cotton, Blackburn Introduce
Balanced Solution to Bolster National Security, End Use of Warrant-Proof Encryption
that
Shields
Criminal
Activity
(June
23,
2020),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/graham-cotton-blackburnintroduce-balanced-solution-to-bolster-national-security-end-use-of-warrant-proofencryption-that-shields-criminal-activity
[https://perma.cc/82ED-KZD4];
Riana
Pfefferkorn, There’s now an even worse Anti-Encryption Bill than Earn It. That Doesn’t Make
INTERNET
SOC’Y
(June
24,
2020),
the
Earn
It
Bill
OK,
CTR.
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/06/there%E2%80%99s-now-even-worse-anti-
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amendments to a variety of current laws, and essentially is an
overhaul of the current scheme such that it imposes obligations
on almost any provider of encryption services or products.419 One
of the provisions, the “assistance capability directive,” even
mirrors the TCN language present in both the UK’s Investigatory
Powers Act and Australia’s Assistance and Access Act.420 The bill
has not yet progressed beyond its introduction in the Senate.421
The jurisdictions discussed in Part III employ a wide variety
of approaches in their own struggles with how to resolve the
Encryption Debate. The United Kingdom’s IPA,422 for example,
can be read to allow for compulsion of a backdoor. On the other
hand, Australia’s AAB423 and Germany’s legal scheme424 articulate
a legislative choice not to permit backdoors considering the
cybersecurity and privacy concerns. If the United States does
choose to pass a bill, the fact that Apple already complies with
Chinese localization laws425 demonstrates that Apple will likely
comply with similar laws in each country in which it operates. Still,
there are several compelling reasons why the US government
should act with caution in passing a law requiring technology
companies to modify code permitting extraordinary access.
B. The Normative Argument Against Backdoors
One of the main arguments against backdoors is that they
undermine data protection measures.426 In the last couple of
years, several companies have been scrutinized by both the public
and by the government for failing to protect customer data. In
2014, Apple came under fire when several celebrities’ iCloud

encryption-bill-earn-it-doesn%E2%80%99t-make-earn-it-bill-ok
[https://perma.cc/U643-YJLN].
419. Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act § 3119(a)(1) defines “consumer
electronic device” as a device that may be purchased by a member of the general public
and one that contains more than 1 gigabyte of storage. That is effectively most electronic
devices out there. See also Pfefferkorn, The Senate’s twin threats, supra note 415.
420. See Pfefferkorn, The Senate’s Twin Threats, supra note 415.
421. Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act, S. 4051, 116th Cong. (2020).
422. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25 (UK).
423. The Assistance and Access Act 2018 (Austl.).
424. See discussion supra Section III.c.
425. See discussion supra Section III.d.
426. See Manpearl II, supra note 75, at 80.
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accounts were hacked.427 Though the investigation determined
Apple’s software was not to blame, the fallout from the incident
highlighted first, Apple’s role as the entity purportedly
safeguarding personal information, and second, the
vulnerabilities of an insecure system.428 By compelling Apple to
create a backdoor, governments risk exacerbating an already
delicate problem. Smartphones have become a critical part of
most peoples’ lives. Not only do iPhones provide a way for people
to communicate, they also serve as storage devices for photos,
notes, mementos, and thoughts.429 iPhones are capable of
retaining sensitive information such as passwords to banking
applications and other services.430 US companies lose over
US$360 billion per year to intellectual property theft, cybercrime,
and costs of downtime.431 An extensive amount of information
would be at risk of being publicly disclosed by malicious third
parties who could manipulate the backdoor access code.432
Additionally, cybersecurity threats from foreign nations alone
provides a compelling argument to not adopt measures that
weaken any available information security systems. The US
government recognized that foreign countries can manipulate
existing technologies when Russian forces influenced voters in
the 2016 election, when a North Korean group hacked into Sony,
and when the popular Chinese app TikTok collected data of US
citizens.433 Government proponents argue that this is simply an
easily resolved engineering problem.434 Mandating a backdoor
requirement would exacerbate existing cybersecurity issues.
Setting aside the cybersecurity issues, several other issues persist.
Second, in a related fashion, mandating backdoors harms all
users of iPhones, not just persons who are individually targeted,
427. Erin Durkin, Hacker sentenced to prison for role in Jennifer Lawrence nude photo
(Aug.
29,
2018),
theft,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/29/nude-photo-hacker-prisonsentence-jennifer-lawrence-victims [https://perma.cc/JUE5-SS6M].
428. Id.
429. See Traylor, supra note 27, at 490.
430. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 169.
431. See id.
432. Morrison, supra note 72, at 425 (discussing the keys under doormats problem).
433. Significant Cyber Incidents, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.,
https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyberincidents [https://perma.cc/GL6U-ZX8J] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
434. See Barr, supra note 115.
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and poses a serious risk to minority defendants.435 If a government
compels Apple to modify its code to provide a backdoor into a
phone, Apple would have to implement this change on every
iPhone for the backdoor requirement to be effective. In its letter
to consumers in the California action, Apple noted:
The government suggests this tool could only be used once,
on one phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the
technique could be used over and over again, on any number
of devices. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent
of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of
locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No
reasonable person would find that acceptable.436

There is no way to guarantee that code will not then be used
on other phones or not be used in an arbitrary manner.
Governments desire the backdoor requirement so it can gain
access to phones of suspects, but backdoors affect every phone
user. A smartphone is the “perfect surveillance device”437 and a
repository of evidence of potentially guilty actions.438 Even if the
code was written such that third parties cannot manipulate and
access the data, there is no guarantee the government itself will
not abuse that privilege. The Snowden disclosures demonstrated
that the US government used iPhones and other smartphones to
spy on both citizens of foreign nations and its own citizens alike.439
At a local level, if given the tool, police forces may use it in an
uneven manner. Disguised racism and unconscious bias may lead
to law enforcement using backdoors to investigate persons of
specific races and from low-income communities. New York City’s
Police Department, for example, was found liable for its stop-andfrisk policy, which drew criticism for the disproportionate
number of members from the Black and Latinx communities
435. David Ruiz, There is No Middle Ground on Encryption, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(May 2, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/there-no-middle-groundencryption [https://perma.cc/JD7D-KC2P] (“No system is perfect, but a backdoor
system for billions of phones magnifies the consequences of a flaw, and the best and the
brightest in computer security don’t know how to make a system bug-free.”).
436. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/2G8F-27J9]; see also
Traylor, supra note 153, at 497.
437. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
438. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 US 373, 388 (2014) (critiquing the
government’s argument on the potential for evidence destruction).
439. See discussion supra Part I.
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being stopped.440 A ProPublica exposé revealed that artificial
intelligence programs used to predict the likelihood of recidivism
in sentencing proceedings marked Black defendants as more
likely to commit another crime as compared to their White
counterparts.441 Backdoors risk increasing the disparity in the
criminal justice system. Since the Snowden disclosures, Apple
enhanced its software and increased its encryption measures to
prevent this behavior in the future.442 By providing backdoor
access, the potential for government abuse returns.
Third, those committing wrongdoings are less likely to use
devices if they know the government can easily gain access to the
device.443 Encrypted phones have ex-post value: law enforcement
seeks to unlock phones because of the probative evidence that is
already on them, not what may be available in the future.444
However, it is reasonable to assume that once criminals are aware
of the vulnerabilities of their devices, they are less likely to use it
to record their wrongdoing. As noted by the Electronic Fronter
Foundation, an organization that defends civil liberties in the
digital world, “it’s difficult to believe that many criminals” would
not be smart enough to seek alternative methods for securing

440. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also
Annual Stop-and-Frisk Numbers, NYCLU, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-data
[https://perma.cc/TTU4-WP8T] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
441. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s software used across the country to predict
future criminals. And it’s biased against blacks, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing [https://perma.cc/EV4V-KYDA].
442. See Shackelford et al., supra note 10; Wakabayashi, supra note 8; Sanger &
Chen, supra note 10.
443. Andrew Crocker, Deep Dive into Crypto “Exceptional Access” Mandates: Effective or
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Aug.
13,
2015),
Constitutional—Pick
One,
ELEC.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/08/deep-dive-crypto-exceptional-accessmandates-effective-or-constitutional-pick-one [https://perma.cc/ZV4T-96EK] (“In
order to believe that [exceptional access] will work, we have to believe there is a set of
criminals . . . not smart enough to do any of the following: Install an alternative storage
or messaging app; Download an app from a website instead of an official app store. Use
a web-based app instead of a native mobile app.”).
444. See Vance 2015, supra note 76, at 9 (highlighting some cases where evidence
recovered from smartphones was helpful in resolving the matter); Brooklyn action, 149 F.
Supp. 3d 341, 348 (2016). In the Brooklyn case, Judge Orenstein observed that the FBI
first wanted access to the phone to get at evidence inculpating the criminal wrongdoer,
but later offered that that the evidence was needed to determine whether there was a
drug conspiracy.
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their information and communications.445 A backdoor
requirement would not prevent criminals from seeking devices
that have encryption technologies or even developing their own,
as Al-Qaeda purportedly did.446
Last, the type of crimes that law enforcement generally seeks
to stop are those which rely on communication between people,
so perhaps the conversation should instead shift to end-to-end
encryption instead of device encryption.447 When trying to access
phones recovered from terrorists, law enforcement seeks
information on other perpetrators and information about future
attacks. British officials, for example, sought a terrorist’s
WhatsApp communications after the terrorist drove a car into
pedestrians in central London in an effort to identify others who
may be planning more attacks.448 Local police forces may want
evidence about past drug deals or information about future drug
deals. The government could work with technology companies to
confront end-to-end encryption instead of device encryption.
This, however, would be an imperfect solution, but a solution
nonetheless. Several types of crimes are not dependent on
communications. Often, iPhones can hold probative evidence
such as photo and video documentation of a crime. As Manhattan
District Attorney Cyrus Vance noted, “That evidence can, among
other things, implicate a particular person in a crime, exonerate
a person of criminal responsibility, or identify additional victims
of a criminal scheme.”449 The sexual exploitation of children
serves as the prevalent example of when getting access to the
content on an encrypted device is necessary. In the United States,
possession of any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct
involving a minor violates federal law.450 Suspected persons
possessing the depictions on the device might never transmit the
illicit materials, thus evading Apple’s software update that scans

445. See Crocker, supra note 443.
446. See Pfefferkorn, Even Worse Encryption Bill, supra note 418.
447. See discussion supra Section II.A.
448. See discussion supra Section II.B.
449. CYRUS VANCE JR., REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
ON: SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY 3 (Nov. 2018) [hereinafter VANCE
2018].
450. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251.
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for such images sent in transmission.451 Without some form of
access to the suspected person’s iPhone, investigators are unable
to gather the very evidence needed to charge him of a federal
crime.
C. The Normative Argument for Lawful Hacking
Lawful hacking is an imperfect solution, but it works. Given
the considerations articulated above, if law enforcement agencies
seek data from an encrypted smartphone, they must be limited to
accessing that data through lawful hacking only. The prevention,
detection, and resolution of crimes is undoubtedly an important
and compelling state interest. To that end, lawful hacking
achieves the objective of gathering evidence from a perpetrator
without compromising the security and privacy of every iPhone
user. There are two main rationales for adopting a law that
supports lawful hacking over one that requires backdoors.
First, the very nature of lawful hacking means that law
enforcement is more likely to concentrate its resources on the
targeted phone.452 It forces law enforcement to pick and choose
the phones they want to expend their resources on. This
minimizes the risk of harm to all iPhone users, compared to
backdoors where the harm is present for everyone. Arguably,
given the concerns of bias in law enforcement, the possibility
always remains that law enforcement will pick the phones
belonging to minority populations, which can further exacerbate
any race disparity issues. But this is less likely to be the case than
with backdoors given that law enforcement may instead select
phones that have the greatest potential to reveal significant
information.
Second, exploiting existing vulnerabilities motivates Apple
and other technology companies to build more secure systems.
Although this creates the technological arms race that law
enforcement is loath to engage in, lawful hacking on its own
serves as a check on technology companies’ promise of privacy
451. Thomas Brewster, How Apple ‘Intercepts’ and Reads Emails When it Finds Child
Abuse,
FORBES
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2020/02/11/how-apple-intercepts-andreads-emails-when-it-finds-child-abuse/?sh=66b41b5b31c2
[https://perma.cc/4Y2WRC86].
452. Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 585.
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and security to its users. The fact that users pay for privacy is
indicative of the need to maintain it.453 Even if Apple users do not
take advantage of it, the protection is necessary for those who
want it and use the phone in reliance on that promise.
Critics speculate that the technological arms race will only
create a new market for lawful hacking. Some fear that lawful
hacking can be a bad thing because technology companies can
bury trapdoors in their software and sell them later to the highest
bidder, demonstrating an abuse of their power for capitalistic
gains.454 Others are concerned that third party companies will
exploit the fact their services are valuable to governments and will
charge exorbitantly high price tags given that taxpayer money
could be put to better use elsewhere.455 More, this creates a price
point that smaller governments with less resources than federal
level agencies like the FBI are unable to afford.456 Even so, to
reiterate, by allowing for lawful hacking as the solution to the
Encryption Debate, it forces governments to be selective in the
phones they want to access without worsening a user’s state of
security and privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Governments seek a simple, efficient, and cost-effective
solution, and those discussed have implemented a variety of
approaches. The United Kingdom prioritized law enforcement
needs and included provisions imposing strict requirements on
technology companies in its approach, despite heavy public
opinion against its adoption. China took this a step further by
ensuring that its legal scheme consistently favors government
453. But see Manpearl, supra note 20, at 192.
454. See Steven Levy, Cracking the Crypto War, WIRED MAG. (Apr. 25, 2010),
https://www.wired.com/story/crypto-war-clear-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/3RUY5XVS]; see also Dunlap, supra note 13, at 1699.
455. See Eric Lichtblau and Katie Benner, F.B.I. Director Suggests Bill for an iPhone
Hacking Topped $1.3 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2016, at B3,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/us/politics/fbi-director-suggests-bill-foriphone-hacking-was-1-3-million.html [https://perma.cc/VVU4-2T9M]; see also Jacobsen,
supra note 7, at 586.
456. VANCE 2018, supra note 449, at 4-5 ("Of course, most state and local law
enforcement agencies do not have the resources of the federal government or this office,
and cannot afford to rely on expensive lawful hacking solutions in everyday investigations
(and, of course, the overwhelming majority of criminal cases in this country are handled
by state and local agencies)”).
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access to private data. At the other end of the spectrum, Germany
strives to put individual privacy and security first, even while
authorizing the use of lawful hacking. Australia, at present, offers
the most balanced approach, though its law remains untested.
The United States has yet to decide its stance on the Encryption
Debate, and if it does, decisionmakers must balance pressing law
enforcement needs with important concerns for privacy and
security.
Moving forward, how the United States approaches the
Encryption Debate matters. The United States is a major player in
the global community,457 and it is likely that its domestic policies
will have an international impact. More, with US technology
companies like Apple as some of the largest companies in the
world,458 domestic legislation could alter the nature of the
products on the international market.459 In theory, in response to
divergent laws, technology companies can tailor their products to
the different demands for each country. For example, Apple can
continue to provide secure devices in the Australian market while
selling devices with backdoor access in the Chinese market.460
Whether this is feasible, or even desirable, is unknown.
More, in the modern global state, countries look to each
other to develop standards and evaluate options for troubling
issues. Australia, for example, used language similar to the UK
law, and in turn influenced US pending legislation. A more
troubling problem, though, comes up when repressive regimes
cite rhetoric from democratic nations to justify its perpetuation
of human rights abuses.461 China, in particular, uses surveillance
457. See Bellovin, supra note 15, at 5.
458. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 167.
459. See Manpearl, supra note 20, at 166; see also James Lewis et al., The Effect of
Encryption on Lawful Access to Communication and Data, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.
8 (Feb. 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/encryption/csis_study_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S2CR-L9Y9].
460. See Segal, supra note 257, at 8.
461. Bunnie Huang & Edward Snowden, Against the Law: Countering Lawful Abuses
of Digital Surveillance, J. OPEN ENG’G (July 21, 2016), https://www.tjoe.org/pub/directradio-introspection/release/2 [https://perma.cc/6X6G-EA2U]; Matt Burgess, What is
the IP Act and how will it affect you?, WIRED MAG. (May 8, 2017),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ip-bill-law-details-passed
[https://perma.cc/A7S78QFG] (“Its impact will be felt beyond the UK as other countries, including authoritarian
regimes with poor human rights records, will use this law to justify their own intrusive
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technology to subject its minority Muslim Uyghur population to
harsh conditions, and has placed over a million members of the
group into concentration camps.462 It defended an early draft of
one of its encryption bills by pointing to the debates in the United
States and the United Kingdom, where it seemed evident that
Western governments made it a practice to compel technology
companies to assist with gathering information from encrypted
phones.463 It was only after condemnation from the international
community that China disposed of the problematic provision, but
it can revisit that argument when democratic nations pass laws
that have the effect of weakening civil liberties. Repressive
regimes can justify their egregious actions by pointing to what is
considered permissible elsewhere.
Setting aside how individual countries use that information,
countries share information gathered from different surveillance
techniques with each other, as is evident with the FVEY network.
This is even more apparent when the shared information is
relevant to several countries, as can be the case with information
regarding terrorist groups. More, instead of taking a state-by-state
approach, countries could aspire to set international standards
and adopt an international approach to the regulation of
encryption technologies.464 These, of course, give rise to concerns
of the global surveillance state and whether countries should do
that because of what was learned from the Snowden disclosures.
Given this context, this Note sought to provide a thorough
explanation of the legal issues and normative concerns driving
the global Encryption Debate. As mentioned in the introduction,
the Encryption Debate is largely an engineering problem that
requires cooperation between technology companies and
governments. But, in identifying a path forward, relevant parties
must not just consider the implications in one country, but the
effect their choice could have globally.
surveillance regimes. “Theresa May has finally got her snoopers’ charter and democracy
in the UK is the worse for it.”).
462. Isobel Cockerell, Inside China’s Massive Surveillance, WIRED MAG. (May 9, 2019),
https://www.wired.com/story/inside-chinas-massive-surveillance-operation/;
Chris
Buckley et al., How China Turned a City into a Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/04/world/asia/xinjiang-chinasurveillance-prison.html [https://perma.cc/BAB8-C6Y3].
463. See Segal, supra note 257, at 1.
464. Id. at 10.

